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Abstract: This thesis presents a rhetorical analysis of the Guerra del Gas 
movement in Bolivia from 2003 to 2005. It views the social movement and its major 
uprisings as emerging from a subaltern counterpublic that grounded its resistance in 
uniquely indigenous rhetoric. Chapter one provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding indigenous rhetoric as embodying a discourse of subaltern sensibilities and 
situating subaltern counterpublic theory within the historic-cultural situation of Bolivia to 
understand contemporary struggles over natural resources and against neoliberal politics 
within the country. The indigenous rhetoric of the Guerra del Gas movement provided a 
direct refutation of natural gas privatization and neoliberal hegemony. The second 
 vii 
chapter is a case study that explores the indigenous rhetoric of the October 2003 and 
May-June 2005 uprisings that characterized the subaltern counterpublic sphere of the 
Guerra del Gas movement. In chapter three the theoretical frame of subaltern rhetoric is 
established to analyze Evo Morales‘ inaugural address as an embodiment of a discourse 
of subaltern sensibilities. The conclusion chapter offers some directions for further 
research and considers how understanding indigenous rhetoric has implications for social 
struggle and organized resistance in a world of increasing globalization and neoliberal 
hegemonic policymaking.  
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Chapter 1: Bolivian Indigenous Rhetoric 
In the countries of Latin America, indigenous oppression and ethnic tensions have 
been commonplace. Since Spanish colonial times, negative images of indigenous peoples 
have provided the justification for widespread policies of political, economic, and social 
exclusion and marginalization. For hundreds of years, indigenous peoples from the Andes 
region and beyond have risen up to resist colonialist leaders and policies, and engage in 
social struggles on a number of fronts. The mobilizations of indigenous populations have 
challenged the prevailing views that have branded them as backward, submissive, and 
anachronistic groups. While indigenous organizing has occurred up through the 20th 
century, it has predominately been initiated from, within, and between indigenous 
communities; the leadership of these organizations has been primarily driven by peasant 
unions, political parties, and revolutionaries. Interestingly, despite this history of 
organizing, indigenous communities have seldom initiated or maintained social 
movements which mobilized around demands for indigenous rights and recognition of 
indigenous identity.1 Instead, indigenous community organizing through peasant unions, 
political parties, and the like has traditionally mobilized ―Indians to forge class, partisan, 
religious, and/or revolutionary identities over, and often against indigenous ones.‖2  
The existence of indigenous peoples‘ struggles is not a novel phenomenon; 
however, the growth of these movements into politically powerful collectives with 
enduring influence in regional and national politics is a relatively recent trend. The rise of 
                                                 
1 Deborah J. Yashar, "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America," 
Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1998): 23. 
2 Ibid. 
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these movements has lead to significant cultural and political changes, as groups have 
challenged exclusionary nationalism, demanding cultural recognition, territory, 
autonomy, and increased political rights.3 In many ways, the work of these indigenous 
groups is extending political participation to previously marginalized groups; thus, 
facilitating the democratization (i.e. capitalist development) processes of many Latin 
American governments.4  
Social movement scholars have focused on the emergence of indigenous 
organizations in Latin America, and have catalogued the factors and trends associated 
with this rise in mobilizations. Several theoretical perspectives have been deployed to 
examine how historically marginalized and exploited people have been successful in 
making an impact on governmental institutions and other social structures of power. 
These have included postmodern critiques of indigenous political programs, 
anthropological concerns about indigenous representation (Warren 1998), class-based 
approaches (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001), and identity-based approaches (Alvarez, 
Dagnino, and Escobar 1998). Deborah Yashar has examined the factors influencing Latin 
American indigenous movements arguing that democratic liberalization provided more 
opportunities to organize, that the existence of trans-community networks of support have 
increased organizing capacity, and that incentives to organize arose in response to the 
effects of neoliberal reforms.5 This analysis is valuable for understanding the relationship 
between neoliberalism and contemporary forms of organized protest in Latina America. 
Scholars have also focused on the commonalities of indigenous movements, examining 
                                                 
3 J. Montgomery Roper, Thomas Perreault, and Patrick C. Wilson, "Introduction to Special Issue on 
Indigenous Transformational Movements in Contemporary Latin America," Latin American Perspectives 
30, no. 1 (January 2003): 12. 
4 Donna Lee Van Cott, Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1994), 22. 
5 Yashar 1998, 30-31; Yashar 1999, 77-78. 
 3 
the discourse of resistance as a struggle against universal oppression, protection of the 
environment, and a common agenda of citizenship.  
Focusing on the common threads among indigenous movements is useful, but it is 
also important to note that these movements represent a great deal of diversity. Their 
characteristics, their demands, and their strategies are extremely specific to the countries 
and regions from which they emerge. Although there are similar factors between the 
countries of Latin America, the struggle for indigenous rights depends upon the 
specificities of the country.6 Rather than focus on the similarities among various Latin 
American countries, I address the call to examine the details of the particular country and 
concentrate exclusively on Bolivia. This project concentrates on the particularities of the 
Bolivian situation surrounding the Guerra del Gas (Gas War), a protest movement that 
took place from 2003 to 2005 and demonstrated opposition to the Bolivian government‘s 
natural gas pipeline proposal that would export gas reserves through Chile where it would 
ultimately be sold to a consortium of international companies. The movement involved 
massive uprisings that united a broad range of the Bolivian society—including 
indigenous peoples, miners, teachers, students, and farmers—against natural gas 
privatization.7 Focusing on Bolivia‘s Guerra del Gas, I argue that the rhetorical 
dimensions of the movement were uniquely indigenous and can be understood as a  
combination of cultural and political practices that engaged diverse forms of resistance. 
This research informs rhetorical scholarship surrounding contemporary dissent, 
mobilization, and social movements by building upon subaltern and postcolonial theories 
to examine uniquely indigenous forms of social protest. Viewing the Guerra del Gas 
                                                 
6 Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, eds. The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America 
(Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 3. 
7 Suzanne York, "Bolivia's Indigenous Revolution," in Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples' Resistance to 
Globalization . ed.  Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli Corpuz (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 2006), 
189. 
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through this lens enables an understanding of the indigenous movement that represents a 
dynamic blend of modern and postmodern rhetorical strategies of resistance.  
My focus on Bolivia centers on the rhetoric of the country‘s recent indigenous 
social movements; the country demonstrates a unique opportunity to examine emerging 
indigenous rhetorical styles and the broader implications of this rhetoric upon social 
movements. With rhetoric as the specific focal point, I contribute to existing scholarship 
on Latin American indigenous social movements by basing my analysis of the distinctive 
circumstances of Bolivia upon the particular rhetorical aspects of indigenous 
mobilization. The conditions of Bolivian neoliberal restructuring in the twenty-first 
century necessitated hybrid strategies of organizing and protest to challenge new forms of 
economic and political domination. With the Guerra del Agua (Water War) of 2000, 
Bolivians presented challenges against the government and its plan to privatize the water 
resources of the country. The Guerra del Agua was a grassroots movement against 
corporate globalization that created a coalition for indigenous peoples and campesinos in 
the Cochabamba region and beyond. It mobilized diverse sectors in strikes, protests, and 
blockades to oppose transnational companies and their attempts to control Bolivian water 
resources.8 While the Guerra del Agua was an extremely important movement, the 
Guerra del Gas demonstrates a more national and coordinated response to the 
government. The social movement engaged in physical forms of protest rhetoric, 
occupied and blocked space as a means of challenging control over natural resources, as 
well as demonstrated that rebellion and resistance was most effective when rooted in 
indigenous cultural and epistemological principles. In particular, I argue that the rhetoric 
of the Bolivian indigenous social movement during the Guerra del Gas can be considered 
a discourse of subaltern sensibilities. Walter Mignolo explains that the ―period expanding 
                                                 
8 Oscar Olivera, ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia (Cambridge: South End Press, 2004), 28-29. 
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from the late fifteenth century to the current stage of globalization, has built a frame and 
a conception of knowledge based on the distinction between epistemology and 
hermeneutics and, in so doing, has subalternized other kinds of knowledge.‖9 This 
process overwhelmingly privileged knowledge from the perspective of modern 
colonialism, deeming other knowledge to be interesting only as objects of study instead 
of the starting point for articulation; thus, subaltern sensibilities refers to knowledge from 
a subaltern perspective ―conceived from the exterior borders of the modern/colonial 
world system.‖10 It is from the subaltern perspective that I begin to view the Guerra del 
Gas and indigenous mobilizations as embodying a discourse of subaltern sensibilities. 
It is not my intention to study the Bolivian subaltern nor speak for the Bolivian 
indigenous peoples, but rather engage in the systematic unlearning of my privilege in 
order to focus on the indigenous discursive modalities present during the Guerra del Gas. 
I consider my position similar to that of a postcolonial intellectual and heed the call that 
Gayatri Spivak described, ―in seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen to or speak 
for) the historically muted subject of the subaltern [woman], the postcolonial intellectual 
systematically ‗unlearns‘ privilege.‖11 Although this work does not focus solely on 
subaltern women, there are strong connections between the words of Spivak that pertain 
to all subalterns and are especially applicable to the Bolivian indigenous populations and 
their rhetorical strategies of resistance. Recognizing these connections, I have attempted 
to adopt a subaltern perspective throughout this work. I have started the process of 
unlearning my own privilege and sought to ground the discussion in the subaltern 
sensibilities of the Bolivian indigenous people. It is from this epistemological foundation 
                                                 
9 Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border 
Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000), 13. 
10 Mignolo 2000, 11. 
11 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 
ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 295. Emphasis in 
original. 
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that I begin to engage the rhetorical facets of the Bolivian indigenous movement. From 
this position, the context for the rhetorical analysis is provided by beginning with a brief 
history of Bolivian resistance and then situating the contemporary movement within the 
areas of subaltern epistemology, indigenous resource struggles, and neoliberal hegemony. 
The South American country of Bolivia has a long history replete with indigenous 
challenges to government repression and invasions on their land. During the centuries-
long period of Spanish colonization, indigenous struggles disputed various colonial 
practices which forced their relocation and subsequently coerced them into laboring in 
the silver mines, textile workshops, and agricultural plantations.12 The enormous wealth 
of Bolivia‘s natural resources had constantly been under the heavy-handed management 
of foreign influences or national minority forces which forged ties with international 
elites to create strategic alliances and virtually guaranteed that the ruling classes maintain 
control. This foreign influence has forced Bolivia, a country with extreme riches below 
the soil, to be one of the poorest nations above the ground. From the sixteenth century, 
when Spain controlled the rich silver deposits at Potosí which were essential for the 
emergence of European capitalism, to the contemporary era of foreign control which runs 
parallel to resource boom-and-bust cycles centering on silver, tin, coca, and most 
recently, natural gas—the Bolivian indigenous population has always contested these 
processes which have comprised indispensable elements in the formation of the global 
economy.13 In recent years, the dissatisfaction with the system of privileging the market 
has grown steadily. The market system has been criticized for concentrating wealth 
among an elite minority while reinforcing poverty among the majority, and reducing state 
provided social services. Diverse rhetorical forms of protest have followed the steady 
                                                 
12 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance 
(London: Zed Books, 2006), 39.  
13 Waltraud Q. Morales, Bolivia: Land of Struggle (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 148. 
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increase in opposition to the economic system. The Guerra del Gas provides a primary 
example of how such opposition translated into a Bolivian indigenous rhetoric which 
embodied a discourse of subaltern sensibilities and portrayed subaltern epistemology. 
INDIGENOUS RHETORIC: A DISCOURSE OF SUBALTERN SENSIBILITIES 
―In Bolivia, where state rule exerts a historically weak hegemony over the 
country, power is decidedly in the hands of the people.‖ (Dangl 2007, 9) 
Natural resources, something that should be a blessing for the country, have been 
turned into a curse of foreign expropriation. Bolivians have attempted to change this 
resource blight, contesting global control through localized social struggle. The Bolivian 
indigenous uprisings that coalesced in 2003 and 2005, during the period that is otherwise 
known as the Guerra del Gas are significant artifacts that warrant further inquiry from 
social movement, rhetoric, and communication scholars alike. The uprisings of 
September-October 2003 and May-June 2005, demonstrate a unique combination of 
identity politics, social movement strategies and tactics, as well as challenges to 
neoliberalism.14 The intricate web of the movement‘s rhetorical dynamics provides a 
multifaceted strategy of opposition to neoliberal reforms and illustrates the way in which 
discourse influences public policy. I demonstrate that the Guerra del Gas movement 
occupied what can be understood as the subaltern public sphere, and deployed indigenous 
rhetoric that transformed into a politically effective force for challenging the hegemonic 
neoliberal order. The efficacy of this political challenge was demonstrated in 2003 when 
then President Sánchez de Lozada (August 2, 2002-October 17, 2003) resigned after 
mounting pressure from the movement; just two years later the existing political order 
was defeated again with the subsequent resignation of the presidential successor Carlos 
                                                 
14 It is not my intention to provide an in-depth critique and analysis of neoliberalism. Although I provide a 
short review of the literature on neoliberalism in subsequent sections, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
engage the expansive literature and critical discussions of neoliberalism in Latin America.  
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Mesa (October 17, 2003-June 9, 2005).15 These resignations were a testament to the 
success of a movement emerging from a subaltern counterpublic sphere. The existence of 
the subaltern counterpublic facilitated indigenous rhetoric which mobilized and organized 
the masses for political change during the Guerra del Gas. 
The subaltern public sphere, as explained by Nancy Fraser, emerges when public 
discourse is considered singular and overarching and thus results in the exclusion of 
particular groups. These subordinated social groups form ―parallel discursive arenas,‖ or 
subaltern counterpublics, which ―invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.‖16 Fraser clarifies that 
subaltern counterpublics are structured sites of collective deliberation as well as 
contestation that engage their dominant counterparts through oppositional 
argumentation.17 The Bolivian indigenous people have historically been excluded from 
the dominant discursive arena of the country. The social groupings formed by the 
Aymara and Quechua indigenous peoples comprise a distinct arena that directly opposes 
the nation‘s exclusionary practices and policies. During the Guerra del Gas the resistance 
of these indigenous groups and other social factors combined to topple the government; 
an accomplishment provided the catalyst for the 2005 presidential elections, culminating 
in the electoral success of country‘s first indigenous leader, Evo Morales. While previous 
studies of the Bolivian resource wars have focused on social movement strategies with 
regard to the self-representation and self-understanding of the movement actors (Spronk 
and Webber 2007, 35-36), in this work I not only investigate indigenous identity issues 
but also examine the context in which the social movement emerged in opposition to 
                                                 
15 Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar. Los Ritmos del Pachakuti (Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón, 2008), 257. 
16 Nancy Fraser, ―Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy,‖ in Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, 123. 
17 Fraser 1992, 125. 
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Bolivian natural gas privatization and framed its demands by deploying a distinctively 
indigenous rhetoric.  
Indigenous Resource Struggles: A Colonial History 
―Resources, and with them workers‘ rights and public services have been 
squashed in a post-colonial free for all.‖ (Dangl 2007, 9) 
It is important that Bolivian resource struggles be examined within the historical 
context of colonial and neocolonial projects that established a political economy rooted in 
ethnic stratification, and provided the basis for a tradition of indigenous and worker 
mobilization and revolt.18 To that end, the historical context of Bolivian neoliberal 
reforms and imperial strategies will be outlined, to offer the background for what gave 
rise to various indigenous struggles leading up to the recent resource wars. These 
historical perspectives are crucial to situate the contemporary period of indigenous 
movements in Latin America and analyze their respective identity and organizational 
dimensions.19 From this political, social, and economic context the Bolivian indigenous 
social movement and resource struggles of the Guerra del Gas can be viewed as a 
continuation of past conflicts. 
The period from 1742 to 1782, known as the ―Age of Andean Insurrection,‖ was 
characterized by a series of indigenous uprisings that culminated in a rebellion of 
thousands of Aymara warriors in 1781. Although the revolt ultimately failed when its 
leader, Túpaj Katari, was captured he has become a symbolic figure of indigenous 
resistance. 20 This is evidenced by contemporary protests against neoliberal policies 
                                                 
18 Silvia R. Cusicanqui, "II. Reclaiming the Nation," NACLA Report on the Americas 38, no. 3 (November-
December 2004): 19-20. 
19 Deborah J. Yashar, "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America," 
Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1998): 30. 
20 Steve J. Stern, "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782: A Reappraisal," in Resistance, rebellion, 
and consciousness in the Andean peasant world: 18th to 20th Centuries, ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 35. 
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frequently invoking his name. Under Spanish colonial rule, indigenous people enjoyed 
few rights and suffered from constant domination which relegated them to the margins of 
society and regarded them as little more than sources of labor and tax revenues. This 
status did not improve much during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite 
the resistance of the majority indigenous population.21  
In 1825, shortly after the Bolivian wars of independence ended the prospect of 
indigenous rights seemed hopeful. The first Bolivian president, Simón Bolívar, took to 
the task of breaking with colonial rule through the political and economic organization of 
the new republic. New laws abolished discriminatory practices against indigenous 
peoples, establishing their freedom from the colonial past. The promise of Bolívar‘s anti-
discrimination legislation was extremely short-lived; a year after its passage the successor 
President José Antonio de Sucre reinstated the commitment to the colonial past—denying 
indigenous access to the ideals of equality and liberty. Through the 1870s international 
demand for raw materials grew, ushering in a new generation of free-trade reforms that 
aimed to revive Bolivian silver-mining industry and liberalize land and capital markets.22 
The reform process involved state-led privatization efforts which effectively codified 
anti-indigenous community practices into law. This discriminatory sentiment was 
implemented through coercive practices such as state sanctioned anti-community 
campaigns waged against indigenous groups. The efforts of state authorities to eliminate 
the indigenous community was a defining characteristic of Bolivian liberalism in the 
nineteenth century, it aimed to make the ―Indians‖ into ―Bolivians‖ while denying rights 
and citizenship status.23 The passage of the Disentailment Law of 1874  explicitly 
                                                 
21 Kohl and Farthing 2006, 35. 
22 Laura Gotkowitz. A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 
1880-1952 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 17-18. 
23 Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson. Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics 
(New York: Verso, 2007), 47. 
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outlawed Indian communities and established procedures to partition communal land 
among community members, who were then required to purchase property titles; the 
remaining plots were sold to the various capitals and reverted to state ownership.24 The 
law aligned with the prevailing liberal economic doctrine by subjecting natural resources 
and communal land to sale and privatization, a move that posed a blatant threat to 
existing indigenous communities.25 In the face of such intolerance the indigenous people 
forged unprecedented alliances with non-indigenous groups, leading to a massive 
rebellion and the eventual return of communal property from the state.26 The 
reinstatement of these communal landholdings served indigenous community leaders 
with a political tool against expropriation in future struggles.27 Over the next several 
decades such political tools facilitated ongoing resistance toward government attempts at 
excluding the indigenous community influence. Opposition was particularly strong 
during the 1870s and 1880s when Bolivian mines were exploited to ensure the 
development of railroad projects; and again during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), 
when Chile invaded Bolivia to seize portions of the territory which left the country 
permanently cut off from the coastline.28 The conflict between Chile and Bolivia 
continued long after the war ended, contributing to strong Bolivian resentment toward its 
neighbor that carried into the twenty-first century when tensions mounted against the 
natural gas privatization plan that proposed gas transportation through Chile. The period 
from 1880 to 1890 was marked by indigenous resistance to land reform efforts which 
began under a presidential resolution authorizing land titles to communities that 
unanimously chose them—yet denying the legal status of indigenous communities to 
                                                 
24 Gotkowitz 2007, 25-26. 
25 Hylton and Thompson 2007, 52. 
26 Gotkowitz 2007, 41. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Hylton and Thomson 2007, 51. 
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hold such rights. The indigenous opposition to the land title and survey process coincided 
with burgeoning discontent inside the Bolivian Liberal Party.29 When Liberal Party 
leaders staged a string of revolts it created a situation of unlikely alliances among 
disgruntled indigenous authorities; the coinciding process of conflict and mobilization 
escalated into the Bolivian civil war.30 
In 1899 the Federal War began, which divided the nation between Liberal elites 
revolting against the conservative government—and ultimately solicited the assistance of 
Aymara indigenous communities to pressure the conservative authorities and their 
colonial-style rule over the indigenous.31 The Liberal alliance with the Aymara was 
influenced in part by the existence of an autonomous indigenous movement which 
defended communal land and promoted the Quechua-Aymara agenda of federalism. The 
existing indigenous movement provided a significant opportunity for the Liberals to 
create an indigenous alliance against the government forces. But this alliance proved to 
be a fragile one, and ties were split between the indigenous groups and the Liberal Party 
during the war. Polarized views of race have been attributed to infecting the liberal elite. 
This civil war is often characterized as a racial war due to the Aymara indigenous 
rebellion which highlighted the uncertainty among Indian-criollo alliances.32 Although 
the race war depiction of the insurgencies has dominated historiography, this portrayal 
often overlooks the focus of Aymara community disputes over labor, property, and 
political issues.33 Despite the variegated disputes that the Aymara represented in the 
struggle, the Liberal Party did not maintain strong relational ties; when the Liberal Party 
                                                 
29 Gotkowitz 2007, 34-35. 
30 Ibid., 36. 
31 Hylton and Thomson 2007, 54. 
32 Marcia Stephenson, Gender and Modernity in Andean Bolivia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 
115. 
33 Hylton and Thomson 2007, 56. 
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triumphed, their victory was over their own indigenous allies as well as the Conservative 
elites. The Liberal Party victory led to the adoption of a political platform that paralleled 
their colonial predecessors, launching another round of oppressive state forces and land 
seizures against the indigenous community.34 Following the civil war the Liberal 
government consolidated its focus on economic commercialization and exportation of 
materials such as rubber, tin, and silver.35 The privatization process was a major aspect of 
post-war liberal reforms which demanded direct legal attacks against indigenous 
communal landholding as a means to achieve its protracted economic and social goals.   
The Liberal government would come to an end during the Chaco War, which took 
place between 1932 and 1935. The war exposed the nation as economically and socially 
backward, controlled by an oligarchy of Liberal and Republican parties in spite of the 
outward appearance of a representative democracy and constitutional government.36 The 
war was initiated by a presidential plan involving settlement policies and aggressive 
military exploration of the uninhabited terrain near the Paraguay border. After Bolivian 
military troops were met with opposition from Paraguay the president ordered the army 
to attack two Paraguayan forts, a move that initiated a three-year conflict that would 
become the longest international war in Latin America in the twentieth-century.37 The 
Bolivian army mobilized an unprecedented number of troops, a majority of which were 
Aymara and Quechua Indians and peasants who were overwhelmingly used in the 
frontlines.38 The war ended with a peace treaty in 1935, leaving Bolivia with huge 
territorial losses and a resurgence of labor organizations and social movements that had 
                                                 
34 Gotkowitz 2007, 36-38. 
35 Leslie Bethell. Latin America: Politics and Society Since 1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 312. 
36 Javier Sanjinés, Mestizaje Upside-Down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 107. 
37 Gotkowitz 2007, 104. 
38 Ibid. 
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been repressed during the conflict.39 The postwar period was characterized by unrest 
throughout the country; the war had provoked a rift in Bolivian middle-class 
consciousness, causing many young soldiers to enter politics and develop populist views. 
As a result, Bolivian politics was dominated by the establishment of nationalist principles 
that defied the ideology of the previous oligarchy and promoted a wider social agenda of 
popular demands.40  
The nation’s economic and political goals of the twentieth century laid the 
groundwork for subsequent crises and eventually culminate in the 1952 Revolution.  
Prior to 1952, citizenship rights were denied under the pongueaje sytem of bonded labor; 
the system provided labor for Bolivia’s large agricultural estates using indigenous pongos 
(who were largely bonded agricultural workers) as well as free peasants (who owned land 
yet also sold their labor).41 This system of inequality combined with years of political 
unrest, uprisings, and military coups that eventually terminated the existing oligarchy as a 
result of the short revolution. The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) came to 
power after the revolution, to implement drastic changes demanded by rural indigenous 
movements and revolutionary unions.42 The period after the revolution provided an end 
to the direct attacks against indigenous land control and established the earliest guarantee 
of citizenship for the Bolivian indigenous people. The national revolution introduced 
important social gains such as universal suffrage, agrarian reform, and expanded labor 
rights. Although deemed a ―revolution,‖ the events of 1952 were not entirely 
revolutionary in scope; they gave rise to political developments that ushered in a 
                                                 
39 Gotkowitz 2007, 106. 
40 Sanjinés 2004, 108. 
41 Kohl and Farthing 2006, 46 
42 Ibid., 47. 
 15 
lingering system of cooptation and control that ultimately hindered the revitalization of 
independent political action by indigenous and popular masses.43  
The post-1952 state sequestered indigenous organizations, subordinating them to 
the authoritarian apparatus and suppressing activism through manipulation. In 1974, the 
dictatorship of Hugo Banzer embarked a crisis of the state which ensured continued state 
organized repression through a tumultuous era of dictatorships and transitory democratic 
periods from 1978-1982.44 As the legitimacy of the state eroded an oppositional 
indigenous movement arose, articulating indigenous-campesino unionism and adopting 
an ideology inspired by eighteenth century anti-colonial uprisings reminiscent of the 
rebellion led by Túpaj Katari. Considered a Katarista-Indianista reawakening among the 
indigenous-campesino unions of the Aymara-Quechua valley as well as the altiplano 
(highland plateau), this resulted in the emergence of several indigenous political parties. 
This recurrence of indigenous-based political and ideological resistance to the state 
anticipated and informed the social struggles of today.45 Shifting ahead to 1997, a 
national law was passed that finally opened the formal political process to organized 
indigenous groups. As a result, the Bolivian indigenous community was awarded the 
right to elect their own representatives to government.46 This step granted indigenous 
representation at the national government level; however, years of organizing and social 
struggle would still be required for the indigenous community to obtain a strong foothold 
within important levels of government.  
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The 1997 law provided a small step on the long road to indigenous political 
representation, ushering in a new collection of oppositional indigenous social movements 
that emerged across the country by 1999. These indigenous social movements represent 
the complexity of indigenous cultures and a variety of socio-economic positions in rural 
and urban locations. Such diverse indigenous cultures range from the Yuki (a semi-
nomadic group of the eastern lowlands), to the Aymara (a powerful highland people who 
have defended their culture for more than 500 years), and Quechua (an Andean highland 
culture that predates the Inca empire).47  
The social movements were primarily comprised of groups was the teacher‘s 
union which became the backbone of the Bolivian Workers‘ Confederation (the 
Confederación Obrera Boliviana—COB); urban movements emerging from Bolivia‘s 
largest cities; and ad hoc committees that formed to defend the Bolivian‘s rights to 
natural resources.48 Such indigenous groups were fundamental in paving the way for 
previous social struggles that focused on indigenous issues and opposed the system of 
governance; however, their efforts did not manage to overrun the political barriers 
holding resistance from below at bay. The Guerra del Gas changed the situation of 
previous struggles by confronting the existing political apparatus head on, the movement 
achieved this through direct resistance to neo-liberal reforms which sparked a national 
crises over resources. 
Neoliberal Hegemony: Lessons from Bolivia 
 ―Neoliberalism seems to be everywhere.‖ (Peck and Tickrell 2002, 380) 
―Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on the market and consumption is not just a 
question of economy but a new form of civilization.‖ (Mignolo 2000, 22) 
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Rooted in the classical liberal political economy of Adam Smith, neoliberalism is 
a free-market economic theory that has rapidly become the dominant ideological 
rationalization for contemporary state ―reform,‖ providing a sort of framework for 
globalization that entails extensive programs of state restructuring which span a wide 
range of local and national contexts.49 What began as a somewhat utopian intellectual 
movement, transformed into a heavily politicized movement in the 1980s when it was 
adopted by the administrations of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret 
Thatcher in Great Britain.50 This lead to the privatization of public services such as 
housing, power, water, and gas in Britain; and, in the United States resulted in cuts in 
federal spending, large tax cuts for corporations, and ultimately deep cuts in social 
spending and large reductions in social welfare.51  The United States and Britain instilled 
future leaders with the latest in Western political and economic orthodoxy, which played 
a pivotal role in diffusing neoliberal ideology around the world.52  Neoliberalism spread 
to international financial institutions, laying the ground rules for global lending agencies 
to operate in the crisis-ridden economies of Bolivia and beyond.  
In the era of neoliberalism the issue of controlling the market supply and demand 
of natural resources has become a hotbed issue around the world. In the recent decade 
common property resources, such as water and natural gas, have been shifted into 
increasingly privatized markets. According to David Harvey, privatization has become a 
fundamental strategy of accumulation by dispossession which has the effect of an 
absolute ―enclosure of the commons into an objective of state policies.‖53 This process 
                                                 
49 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickrell, "Neoliberalizing Space," Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 380-381. 
50 Kohl and Farthing 2006, 15-18; Peck and Tickrell 2003, 381-382. 
51 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 172-173. 
52 Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and 
the Contest to Transform Latin American States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 46-47. 
53 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 158. 
 18 
entails the release of a set of assets formerly owned by the state, at very low (and in some 
instances zero) cost, that can then be seized by private capital and used for profit.54 
Privatization has been the linchpin of mainstream international development since the 
1980s; following the economic rationale that private firms have greater incentives to 
operate efficiently and as such can respond to markets and allocate resources better than 
public ones, governments have privatized their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 
hopes that this efficiency would translate into faster growth for the national economy.55 
Neoliberalism has different variations; it is neither a singular nor monolithic entity but 
rather, multiple and often contradictory neoliberalisms exist. As a result, the experience 
of neoliberalism may differ from one country to another.56  
The Bolivian era of neoliberal restructuring has been considered to be one of the 
most radical in Latin America, in part because the country launched the task of market 
liberalization while simultaneously shifting toward political democratization—coupling 
these transitions ultimately increased the difficulties and tensions of both.57 Bolivia, 
home of the second largest natural gas reserves in South America, has become one of the 
most significant arenas for neoliberal strategies and struggles.58 For decades the country 
has been subjected to the restrictions of the global neoliberal system ―that privileges the 
market, reduces the ability of the state to provide social services, and simultaneously 
concentrates wealth among an elite minority while it reinforces poverty among the 
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majority.‖59 Complex arrays of struggles that draw upon a broad spectrum of civil society 
have emerged in response to privatization processes. These contemporary struggles are 
not characterized, like many of their predecessors, by operating solely under a working-
class or trade-union banner.60 Quite distinctly, they embody a variety of social interests 
and unite the opposition across a spectrum of indigenous and popular sectors. The social 
resistance to privatization of the water and hydrocarbons sectors of the Bolivian economy 
represents a fundamental shift in the way that social movements articulate their demands 
in the neoliberal era controlled by transnational capital. These social movements 
represent unique perspectives and express the demands of an often excluded indigenous 
population. The immediate demands of Bolivian movements have presented fundamental 
challenges to the prevailing political and economic system.61 The actions of ordinary 
Bolivians mobilizing against neoliberal globalization have gained considerable attention 
across a variety of international activist networks. While neoliberal economic and 
political reforms have certainly provided a rallying point for these movements, the 
responses to these issues have been variegated and encompass a wide range of rhetorical 
tactics and strategies. 
Bolivian plans for privatization were spearheaded by President Gonzalo Sanchez 
de Lozada (―Goni‖). Lozada was the primary designer of the country‘s neoliberal 
program which was considered to be among the most innovative in the world, introducing 
plans that would be modeled elsewhere.62 The Bolivian government introduced policies 
of structural adjustment in 1985, a period known as the neoliberal invasion characterized 
                                                 
59 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance 
(London: Zed Books, 2006), 2. 
60 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 162-169. 
61 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance 
(London: Zed Books, 2006), 2. 
62 Kohl 2006, 305. 
 20 
by structural adjustment programs and hyperinflation.63 From 1993 to 1997, during 
Goni‘s first administration the Plan de Todos (Plan for Everyone) was implemented 
which began the phase of neoliberal consolidation through expansive state-wide 
reforms.64 These measures attempted to reinvent the nation by rewriting the constitution, 
decentralizing the administration, and privatizing the largest of the state-owned firms.  
One goal was to establish neoliberal hegemony at the national level that would mediate 
between the Bolivian and global economy.65 A final step of the reforms involved the 
privatization of the main state enterprises such as the national mining, oil, gas, and 
telephone companies. This functionally shifted the remainder of economic control away 
from the state, allowing private and foreign influences unfettered access to Bolivia‘s 
economic sectors; the immediate effects were extensive, especially in terms of the 
supervision and allocation of natural resources such as natural gas.66 These reforms 
sealed the fate of hydrocarbons to the process of privatization, returning the vast 
resources to a system of management not used since the 1920s.67 Afforded such access, 
foreign companies were essentially given the green light to exploit the Bolivian natural 
gas industry—a concession that would strip the nation out of an estimated hundreds of 
millions, if not billions of dollars for decades to come.68 The ultimate effect of the 
neoliberal reforms led to massive re-institutionalization of natural resource 
management—a transition that created a major source of tension for the Bolivian people 
and sparked the emergence of social movements challenging the privatization of natural 
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resources.69 Although social struggle in Bolivia has been a recurring trend throughout the 
country‘s history, scholars have focused on contemporary indigenous mobilizations from 
the Guerra del Agua through the Guerra del Gas as exemplars of struggle focused 
specifically against neoliberalism (Kohl 2006, Kohl and Farthing 2006, Perreault 2006, 
Spronk and Webber 2007). The struggle over natural resources focuses on popular protest 
against Bolivian neoliberal hegemony, the history of neoliberal globalization has had a 
profound influence on Bolivian politics and relates to issues of democracy and markets, 
state restructuring, and citizenship (Kohl 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2006). The similarities 
and differences associated with the resource wars of 2000 and 2003 have been examined 
by Thomas Perreault (2006), who focused on the major factors of the protest that were 
expressed through claims of political participation, citizenship, nation, and regional 
autonomy. Comparisons have been made regarding the various ways in which 
contemporary Bolivian social movements have framed their demands in the struggle 
against water and natural gas privatization (Spronk and Webber 2007). The Guerra del 
Gas has been characterized as presenting a stronger challenge to neoliberalism than the 
Guerra del Agua. The direct confrontation was made possible by macro framing of the 
natural gas issue which placed the movements‘ demands on the political agenda and 
demonstrated revolutionary implications of social opposition to resource privatization. 
Each of these studies has provided valuable insight towards the recent natural resource 
protests and the crisis of governance in Bolivia. The authors have combined historical, 
economic, and social movement perspectives to analyze the Bolivian resource wars of the 
twenty-first century; their work has provided a strong base for understanding the 
historical and economic challenges imposed upon the Bolivian people and their struggle 
for resource control.  
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The backdrop of centuries of exclusionary policies, the history of neoliberal 
hegemony and social struggle to preserve natural resources and indigenous livelihood 
provides the initial context from which the Guerra del Gas emerged. Drawing from many 
of the earlier approaches to evaluating the resource wars, my work also examines the 
social movement within the frame of globalization and neoliberal politics. Additionally, it 
incorporates a historic-cultural perspective that is based in postcolonial theories and 
conducts a rhetorical study of the Guerra del Gas and the immediate outcome of Bolivian 
political leadership. A rhetorical approach is necessary to gain insight on the indigenous 
social movement mobilizations and the discourse of subaltern sensibilities that emerged 
to directly refute natural gas privatization. With this contextual and theoretical frame in 
mind, I now turn to the particular lens of social movement theory which situates the 
Guerra del Gas as a subaltern counterpublic that combined indigenous rhetoric and anti-
neoliberal strategies to challenge hegemonic economic and colonial practices.  
Bolivian Public Sphere: A Turn to Subaltern Counterpublics 
 ―Oppression and subordination are rarely suffered randomly. Certain groups of 
people have been more likely than others to be subordinated and oppressed, to 
perceive themselves as such, and to organize in opposition to subordination and 
oppression.‖ (Asen and Brouwer 2001, 8) 
Neoliberalism has intensified economic inequality leaving larger numbers of 
people to face absolute poverty; its policies have not only created abject material 
conditions, but have also transformed the politico-cultural terrain in which social 
struggles are undertaken.70 Despite overpowering neoliberal policies which have 
threatened popular movements and unsettled the language of protest, the system of 
neoliberalism lacks the strong consent and support from civil society necessary to 
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maintain itself as a hegemonic system of governance; as such, it is subject to attack by 
anti-hegemonic social movements that are grounded in a number of demands which 
represent a combination of class, gender, ethnicity, identity, territorial, or religious 
interests.71 
This unique combination of indigenous social movement demands has been 
previously discussed by scholars who have argued that mobilization has centered on 
issues such as class, culture, citizenship, democracy, and resources.72 Engaging in social 
struggle has historically been a tedious and often extremely polemic task. Activist groups 
do not always agree and the interests of antagonistic groups do not always correspond. 
Although disputes exist over specific mobilization issues or the tactics necessary to 
achieve their demands, social movements often find unity when points of rupture tie the 
groups‘ interest together. When common interests are found, antagonist groups form 
connections and establish communicative links; the significance of social movements lies 
in understanding their articulations along with other demands and struggles. Stuart Hall 
considers how the unity of discourse can be explained by a theory of articulation which 
provides ―a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain 
conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do 
not become articulated, at specific conjectures, to certain political subjects.‖73 The theory 
of articulation illustrates the importance of rhetoric in relation to social movement 
mobilization, reflecting the possibility of converging interests through a common 
discourse. These rhetorical unities relate to Antonio Gramsci‘s argument that that diverse 
classes or groups can unite under particular historical circumstances, and form a 
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collective will that may allow them to enforce their interests to gain control of the state.74 
This process of achieving state control is extremely complicated and is often riddled with 
conflict. Hall and Gramsci‘s analysis, while not identical nor always complimentary, is 
pertinent to the context of Bolivian indigenous social movements which have acted as 
simultaneous forces of resistance and consolidation in terms of creating alliances with 
political parties and popular classes.75 The rhetoric of the Guerra del Gas movement 
facilitated unification across a broad spectrum of oppositional groups; this was made 
possible by emergent indigenous resistance from a subaltern counterpublic sphere  
Nancy Fraser has argued that ―conceptual resources‖ enable the expression of 
oppositional cultural identities.76 Marcia Stephenson built from this idea to explain that 
the public sphere is a useful conceptual resource for understanding how oppositional 
groups critically engage in the practice of democracy.77 A brief review of public sphere 
literature is necessary before applying these theoretical perspectives to contemporary 
Bolivian activism during the Guerra del Gas. Fraser and Stephenson critique the original 
conception of the public sphere provided by Jürgen Habermas, who argued that the public 
sphere refers to a realm where access is guaranteed to all citizens; this theorization of the 
bourgeois public sphere is explained as ―the sphere of private individuals assembled into 
a public body.‖ 78 Habermas‘ argument works in a purely Western format of the public 
sphere; he argued that the emergence of the public sphere is linked to the new social 
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structure established by the system of trade and finance capitalism, and considered the 
public sphere to be a realm for the citizens‘ public use of reason to engage and debate 
rules governing the privatized arenas of social labor and commodity exchange.79 This 
definition of the public sphere centers upon the individual use of reason, yet it has been 
criticized for ignoring the possibility that individuals could face exclusion from 
participation if their style of reasoning failed to conform to commonly accepted standards 
of reason.80 The Habermasian conception of the public sphere has been thoroughly 
debated, and theorized which has led to contemporary works that guide the public sphere 
theory discussion away from this Western formation and toward a more subversive 
framework.  
The counterpublic sphere is a notable theory which advanced the subversive 
direction of public sphere theory. Rita Felski explains the counterpublic sphere in terms 
of feminism as ―an oppositional discursive arena within the society of late capitalism,‖ 
that can be ―a key to analyzing the distinctive yet often diversified political and cultural 
practices of [the women‘s] movements.‖81 This model of a public sphere focuses on 
―communicative networks, social institutions, and political and economic structures 
through which ideologies are produced and disseminated.‖82 Nancy Fraser supports 
Felski‘s explanation of counterpublics and provides a revisionist historiography which 
critiques the Habermasian conception of a bourgeois public sphere and argues that 
subordinated groups have an avenue to engage in communicative processes and articulate 
and defend their interests in the comprehensive public sphere. Fraser argues some 
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counterpublics should be called subaltern counterpublics to signal that they are ―parallel 
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, 
and needs.‖83 Thus, the subaltern counterpublic sphere provides a locus for expressing 
alternate ways of knowing; it is a space where cultural and political right to difference are 
legitimated, and oppressed groups are not viewed as objects but are understood as 
subjects of discourse.84 I will later return to these three characteristics of the subaltern 
counterpublic sphere, addressing each one in sequence. These discursive arenas deploy 
communicative practices that resist the control of dominant groups, and as a result the 
study of counterpublics is extended to include a range of standpoints, social movements, 
and marginal populations.85  
Additionally, a counterpublic is considered to be ‗counter‘ in status because it is 
excluded in various ways from the predominant means of political discourse and as a 
result suffers from a lack of political power.86 This critique is particularly relevant to the 
case of Latin America where governmental arenas have been restricted to a privileged 
fraction of the population while subaltern groups and classes have been denied access to 
and information about important policy decisions.87 Felki‘s emphasis on communicative 
networks, political and economic structures, as well as the cultural practices of social 
movements is pertinent to establishing a rhetorical framework for indigenous social 
movements. Counterpublic theory provides a mechanism to examine the oppositional 
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discursive space that Bolivian indigenous social movements occupy, as well as a means 
for analyzing the constitution of these collectivities and the political implications of their 
mobilization. Thus, the counterpublic sphere is an appropriate arena for examining the 
rhetoric of Bolivian indigenous social movements.  
Fraser explains that the term subaltern counterpublic is coined by combining the 
term ―subaltern‖ from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and ―counterpublic‖ from Rita Felski; 
since the term counterpublic has been sufficiently defined and explained above, I now 
turn to a brief review of the literature and an explanation of the term subaltern.88 The 
term subaltern is loosely developed from the work of Antonio Gramsci, who argued that 
the term ‗subaltern‘ designates non-elite or subordinated social groups; it is a useful term 
for problematizing concepts of the sovereign subject.89 In her 1988 work, Spivak 
reviewed and in part critiqued Gramsci‘s work on the subaltern classes; her consideration 
of the marginal and oppressed posited the thorny question: can the subaltern speak?90 
This question problematizes sovereign subjectivity and the role of the intellectual in the 
constitution of subalterns it argues that it is impossible to separate the agent from the 
object.91  Spivak settles on a specific definition of the subaltern, citing Ranajit Guha‘s 
definition of subalternity which explains that social groups represent ―the demographic 
difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as 
the ‗elite‘.‖92 The category of the subaltern refers to more than just the economically 
dispossessed, the marginalized, the oppressed, or the Other; Spivak defines subaltern in 
postcolonial terms by stating that ―everything that has limited or no access to the cultural 
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imperialism is subaltern—a space of difference.‖93 Thus, for Spivak, the subaltern 
existence in the space of difference cannot be alleviated by outside attempts; efforts to 
grant a collective voice to the subaltern or to ―speak for‖ the subaltern condition only re-
entrenches their dependency upon Western intellectuals, and perpetuates the logocentric 
assumption (in this context, the homogenizing logic) of cultural unity among a 
heterogeneous people.94 
Since its publication, Spivak‘s question, can the subaltern speak, has been subject 
to a heated and ongoing debate. In response to critics, Spivak has explained that her essay 
was referring to the space that is cut off from the lines of mobility in a colonized 
country—and that moments of insurgency are moments when subalternity is brought to a 
point of crisis; every moment that is noticed as a case of subalternity is undermined.95 
This undermining of subalternity arises, in part, because there is ―something of a not-
speakingness in the very notion of subalternity,‖ because the subaltern occupies the 
marginalized space it is not possible to look at the pure subaltern.96 It should be clarified 
that since the essay‘s publication Spivak has voiced concern that the term subaltern has 
become a ―buzzword for any group that wants something that it does not have,‖ and 
clarified that saying the subaltern cannot speak should not be taken literally as ‗the 
subaltern cannot talk.‘97 
                                                 
93 Leon de Kock, ―Interview With Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation Writers Conference in South 
Africa‖ A Review of International English Literature, 23 (1992): 29-47. 
94 Spivak, ―Can the Subaltern,‖ 84. 
95 Spivak 1996, 289.  Spivak explains that ―it is the force of a crisis that operates functional displacements 
in discursive fields.  In my reading of the volumes of Subaltern Studies, this critrical force or bringing-to-
crisis can be located in the energy of the questioning of humanism in the post-Nietzschean sector of 
Western European structuralism, for our group Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and a certain Lévi-
Strauss. These structuralists question humanism by exposing its hero—the sovereign subject as author, the 
subject of authority, legitimacy, and power. There is an affinity between the imperialist subject and the 
subject of humanism‖ (Spivak 1988, 10). 
96Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Subaltern Talk: Interview with the Editors ," in The Spivak Reader: 
Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 289. 
97 Spivak 1996, 290-291. 
 29 
This review of Spivak and the subaltern demonstrates that the term ‗subaltern‘ is a 
complicated one; yet, its complexity illustrates an integral aspect of Fraser‘s 
conceptualization of the subaltern counterpublic sphere. The characteristics of the 
subaltern counterpublic relate to the Guerra del Gas in several ways.98 First, the subaltern 
counterpublic is a site for expressing alternate ways of knowing. Thus, an understanding 
of Bolivian indigenous rhetoric requires an examination of indigenous epistemologies, or 
subaltern knowledges. Walter Mignolo argues that for the past five hundred years under 
modern colonialisms and global designs the economic and social forces of globalization 
have ushered in hegemonic forms of knowledge which subjugated and subalternized 
indigenous knowledges.99 Mignolo argues for perspectives of coloniality to be adopted in 
order to subvert and challenge dominant Western epistemologies that have functionally 
erased subaltern knowledges. Mignolo‘s perspective merges well with subaltern 
counterpublic theory in the Bolivian context. Rooted in subaltern epistemologies, the 
Guerra del Gas represented Other forms of knowledge and was informed by the 
particular indigenous social positions of its members.100 The second characteristic of 
subaltern counterpublics pertains to legitimating cultural and political rights to difference. 
John Beverley explains that subaltern studies offers a method of intervening on the side 
of the subaltern, and provides a constructive articulation of ―forms of political and 
cultural agency in the context of globalization. It entails both a critique of hegemony and 
a possibility of a new form of hegemony.‖101 Thus, subaltern studies are a useful vantage 
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point engaging indigenous rhetoric that emerged in the context of hegemonic neoliberal 
practices to establish unique political and cultural agency for change. Finally, subaltern 
counterpublics are characterized by viewing oppressed groups as subjects of discourse 
and for challenging the traditional view that subordinate groups are mere objects of 
discourse for academic research.   
I recognize my difficult and troubled location as a student conducting academic 
research regarding the subaltern counterpublic of Bolivian indigenous social movements. 
I acknowledge that I occupy a position of privilege and attempt to build a framework that 
views the oppressed Bolivian indigenous groups as subjects of a discourse from subaltern 
sensibilities—otherwise understood as indigenous rhetoric. My argument is not an 
academic discourse on the subaltern but rather works for the subaltern. In working for the 
subaltern, I draw from a variety of interdisciplinary theories and perspectives rather than 
examining the movement through either a class-based or an identity-based approach.102 
However, the complexity of Bolivian cultural dynamics and the unique circumstances 
surrounding its entry into a system of neoliberal governance requires an intersectional 
analysis when engaging the rhetoric of the Guerra del Gas. Such an approach considers 
the converging factors of social upheaval. Gerardo Otero succinctly argued for an 
interdisciplinary approach, stating that: 
in the case of indigenous-peasant mobilization, class and identity struggles are 
actually inseparable. Emphasizing one or another determinant or "variable" will 
necessarily lead to an incomplete and one-sided analysis. If there is any 
subordinate social group in Latin America for which both class grievances and 
identity rights issues are similarly important in their constitution as political 
subjects, it is the indigenous population.103 
                                                 
102 See Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Alvaro, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998 for theorization focusing on 
singular perspectives of either class-based or identity-based analyses of Latin American social movements.  
103 Gerardo Otero, "The 'Indian Question' in Latin America: Class, State, and Ethnic Identity 
Construction," Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (February 2003): 249.  
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This assessment is a sound one, and provides a guide for my rhetorical approach to the 
Guerra del Gas.  In my attempt to avoid a one-sided analysis, I build from the work of 
various theorists from social movement and communication scholars, to historical, 
anthropological, and political perspectives. Proceeding in this way extends existing social 
movement & subaltern counterpublic theory to the Bolivian indigenous populations and 
informs an understanding of the movement and its subsequent political, social, and 
economic effects in Bolivia. 
CHAPTER PREVIEW 
 The following chapters provide a series of case studies that explore the Guerra 
del Gas through the lens of protest movements and subaltern counterpublics and examine 
indigenous rhetoric as a discourse of subaltern sensibilities. This perspective uncovers the 
story of a country rising against neoliberalism by positioning its resource struggles from 
within a subaltern counterpublic sphere.  In the first case study, I examine the Guerra del 
Gas by focusing on the specific periods of September-October 2003 and May-June 2005. 
I analyze press releases and communiqués from the key social movement organization 
Coordinadora Nacional de Recuperación y Defensa del Gas (NCDRG), and the political 
organizations Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and Confederación Sindical Única de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). I argue that the rhetoric of the 
movement operates in tandem with the particular uprisings of 2003 and 2005 to represent 
subaltern counterpublics that deployed ethnic tropes and metaphors to mobilize the 
Bolivian people and unite various social groups under the common cause of attaining 
nationalization of the country‘s natural gas.  
In the second case study, I shift focus from the uprisings of the Guerra del Gas to 
the immediate outcome of the movement—the electoral victory of Evo Morales. The 
Guerra del Gas ruptured the existing political leadership and ignited a chain of events 
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that facilitated Morales‘ emergence as an indigenous leader for the country. The victory 
of Evo Morales established a platform of change within Bolivian politics and his 
leadership represented a major break from past Bolivian presidents. Morales was the first 
president elected by popular vote, the first to represent a non-traditional political party, 
and the first president elect with a primarily indigenous ethnic background. Against this 
unique backdrop, the outset of his presidential politics were marked by his utilization of  
a specific indigenous discourse. In the third chapter I use standpoint epistemology and the 
Aymara theory of ―Both Eyes‖ as lenses that work in combination with the concepts of 
de-colonial thinking and subversive complicity to uncover the indigenous rhetoric in Evo 
Morales‘ 2006 inauguration address.104 I argue that Morales‘ indigenous rhetoric 
represents a contemporary application of the Aymara theory of ―Both Eyes‖ which 
enables the Bolivian indigenous population to be brought out of the periphery and into 
the focus of Bolivian politics. 
 
                                                 
104 Following Javier Sanjinés in his work Mestizaje Upside-Down, I use quotations and capitalize these 
terms to emphasize their special character as a theoretical perspective.  
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Chapter 2: Resisting Neoliberalism Through a Bolivian Subaltern 
Counterpublic   
Although the issue of gas development had been discussed by Bolivia‘s 
politicians as early as 2001, it did not emerge as a major source of public mobilization 
and protest until 2003.  In 2000, prior to organizing around the issue of natural gas, the 
country experienced the Guerra del Agua movement which involved tens of thousands of 
protesters against a government water privatization plan with foreign-owned firm Aguas 
de Tunari.1 When the corporation took over the water project it hiked up water rates for 
local farmers and poor neighborhoods. In response, popular sectors organized protests 
that caused the government to declare a state of siege, and ultimately forced the expulsion 
of the company.2 The eruption of organized protests demonstrated the public‘s strong 
opposition to the dual forces of neoliberalism and globalization.3 In 2003, just a few short 
years after the Guerra del Agua concentrated enormous efforts against water 
privatization, gas became the magic word; representing ―a symbol of all past resources 
lost and all possible wealth for the future. Like coca and water, the gas was viewed as a 
natural resource for survival.‖4 Natural gas represented the next arena for national 
privatization. 
The Guerra del Gas fought to maintain control over the country‘s natural 
resources and prevent the government‘s privatization plans from coming to fruition.  It 
marked the beginning of collective action against gas privatization from a social 
                                                 
1 Perreault 2006, 150; Spronk and Webber 2007, 39-40. 
2 Nancy Postero,"Indigenous Responses to Neoliberalism: A Look at the Bolivian Uprising of 2003," 
PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 28, (2005): 73.  
3 Willem Assies, "David Versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of 
Social Protest in Bolivia," Latin American Perspectives 30, no. 3 (May 2003): 14. 
4 Benjamin Dangl, The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia (Oakland: AK 
Press, 2007), 123. 
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movement that mounted ―contentious challenges through disruptive direct action against 
elites, authorities, [and] other groups‖ and sought to obstruct and ultimately interrupt the 
activities of the establishment.5 The movement emerged as a subaltern counterpublic; 
with those who had been most excluded leading the way in terms of politically organizing 
and taking the initiative to protest yet another government plan to export the country‘s 
natural resources.6  The movement coalesced around the issue of natural gas privatization 
which was commonly perceived as the source of the latest economic problems, and was a 
symbol of the government‘s exploitative practices.7 The natural gas issue was able to 
unify the movement by underscoring the injustice of the Bolivian social condition—being 
poor in a land full of rich natural resources. Natural gas became the collective action 
frame of the movement, Snow and Benford explain that such frames ―underscore and 
embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and 
immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable.‖8 The collective 
action frame combined with the existing Bolivian cultural matrix and functioned as a 
mobilizing symbol which motivated the movement. The existing Bolivian cultural milieu 
lent itself to such collective action against natural gas privatization due to the ―conceptual 
linkage between natural gas and political-economic and development models.‖ 9 This 
combination set the stage for collective action from a subaltern counterpublic, an 
oppositional arena where social movement actors were able to articulate their struggle 
against the dominant neoliberal ideology. The emergence of the counterpublic grew from 
                                                 
5 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5. Italics in original. 
6 Thomas Perrault, ―From the Guerra del Agua to the Guerra del Gas: Resource Governance, 
Neoliberalism, and Popular Protest in Bolivia,‖ Antipode 38 (2006): 166. 
7 Mirko Orgáz García, La Guerra del Gas: Nación versus Estado Transnacional en Bolivia (La Paz: 
OFAVIN, 2003), 50. 
8 David E. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Frontiers in Social 
Movement Theory, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992), 137. 
9 Perreault 2006, 162. 
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the basic questions regarding access to land, the cost of basic services, and management 
of resources; such concerns were all primarily focused on the material means of 
supporting social reproduction.10 Since natural gas offered such structural significance for 
Bolivians, the strategic frame resonated with the populace and provided the movement 
with a space to articulate demands to end foreign control over natural gas across the 
Bolivian cultural spectrum. The movement offered a critique of cultural values from the 
standpoint of the marginalized indigenous group within society; natural gas united those 
from the Aymara indigenous groups of the Altiplano region to the urban, middle, and 
upper class groups from Santa Cruz. 11  Unlike the previous resource war over water, the 
discourse of the Guerra del Gas movement materialized into concrete actions at the level 
of the national government which ended the gas privatization plan and established 
fundamental changes to the existing political leadership.  
Two major uprisings that occurred during the Guerra del Gas greatly contributed 
to the movement‘s overall success at achieving its goals against natural gas privatization, 
these uprisings provide a provocative case study for viewing the movement as a subaltern 
counterpublic. In this chapter, I analyze the social movement as a subaltern counterpublic 
while highlighting particular moments such as the September-October 2003 and the May-
June 2005 uprisings from a social movement perspective. This approach is pluralistic in 
scope, grounded in subaltern counterpublic theory it combines various social movement 
and rhetorical perspectives to discuss the issues of coalitional politics, strategies, tactics, 
institutional violence, and leadership of the Guerra del Gas movement.  Representing a 
unique oppositional discourse that emerged from, within, and about the Bolivian 
indigenous people, the movement demonstrated the people‘s stake in controlling natural 
                                                 
10 Alvaro García Linera, "Sindicato, Multitud y Comunidad: Movimientos Sociales y Formas de 
Autonomía Política en Bolivia," in Tiempos de Rebelión, ed. Alvaro García et al. (La Paz: Muela del 
Diablo, 2001), 43. 
11 Perreault 2006, 163. 
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gas resources.  The movement also shaped the people in terms of galvanizing opposition 
across indigenous and popular sectors; its discourse provided a combined approach of 
resistance and coalition building that solidified opposition toward another state-led round 
of Bolivian neoliberal structuring. As a result of the 2003 and 2005 uprisings the 
administration that promoted such extensive neoliberal endeavors was forced to give in to 
the social movement demands.  The intricacy of the Guerra del Gas and its outcomes are 
difficult to understand without first situating the historical context of the resource 
struggles and neoliberal government policies in Bolivia. In the section that follows, the 
history of indigenous resource struggles and neoliberal control are outlined to provide the 
historical backdrop from which the Guerra del Gas emerged.  
THE STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
In 2003, the Guerra del Gas movement took opposition to then President Sánchez 
de Lozada, the bearer of Bolivian neoliberal reforms.  Known widely as ―Goni,‖ he had 
served a previous presidential term from 1993 to 1997.12 His earlier administration 
implemented a number of neoliberal reforms that resulted in drastic reduction of social 
program and increased natural resource exploitation by foreign companies.13 Although 
these economic reforms were unpopular, the administration was able to circumvent 
public opposition by simultaneously passing social reforms that aimed to appease the 
populace.  The reforms reflected a commitment toward social justice for the majority 
indigenous population of Bolivia. 14 Unfortunately, the reality was quite the opposite; the 
reforms did not change existing colonial power relations and were virtually ―incapable of 
                                                 
12 Perreault 2006, 15. 
13 Postero 2005, 73-74. 
14 According to the 2001 census, 78 percent of the rural population and 53percent of the urban population 
claimed an indigenous ethnicity. Sixty-two percent of the population over fifteen years old self-identified as 
indigenous. (INE 2009, http://www.ine.gov.bo) 
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changing the basic material conditions of life for the majority of Bolivians.‖15 In spite of 
the guarantees afforded within the law books, hierarchical relations continued—virtually 
ensuring the marginalization of indigenous perspectives from the political process. This 
legacy of broken promises combined with the major consequences of neoliberal 
restructuring to create an impending crisis for Bolivia‘s large poor sectors.16 Set against 
this precarious national situation, Lozada assumed the presidency again in August of 
2002 and began initiating several new rounds of neoliberal policies. This time his term 
was characterized by strong public opposition.  
Popular discontent was bought to a boiling point when the administration 
introduced a proposal to build a natural gas pipeline that would export Bolivian gas 
through a Chilean port and out to Mexico and the United States of America.17 The plan 
was to be executed by a consortium of companies that not only controlled the largest area 
of gas reserves in Bolivia, but also enjoyed the lowest operating costs for oil and gas 
exploration and production in the world.18 According to the plan gas would be sold to 
foreign importers at more than twenty times the price the Bolivian government paid; and 
Chile would face extreme profits from processing the Bolivian gas in its port.19 The plan 
was met with overwhelming rejection by the Bolivian people. It represented another 
government attempt to export Bolivian natural riches into the pockets of foreign 
companies and economies, while ensuring the Bolivian people would remain 
impoverished at home.20 Additionally, the prospect of exporting natural gas through 
                                                 
15 Benjamin Kohl, ―Democratizing Decentralization in Bolivia: The Law of Popular Participation,‖ 
Journal of Planning Education and Research 23, (2003): 161.  
16 Lesley Gill, Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the 
Bolivian State (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2000), 4-5. 
17 Perreault 2006, 151. 
18 Hylton and Thomson 2004, 17. 
19 Dangl 2007, 121. 
20 Hylton and Thomson 2004, 18. 
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Chile contributed to the controversy. Chile was a contentious factor in the exportation 
plan because many Bolivians still resent their defeat in the War of the Pacific, an 
outcome which left Bolivia landlocked and its people outraged by the loss of access to 
the sea.21 Despite strong opposition to the Chilean factor, Lozada was unburdened by 
nationalist sentiment; he openly pledged support for exportation through Chile due to the 
economic expediency of the option.22 With his pledge Lozada effectively signed his term 
over to a tumultuous, violent, and protest ridden fate.  
A Bolivian Subaltern Counterpublic Emerges 
The Guerra del Gas facilitated the alignment of social forces through new 
articulations with new allies, creating a multifaceted collection of social groups that 
banded together in the insurrections of September-October 2003 to contest Lozada‘s 
neoliberal policies; and later in May-June 2005 to dispute then President Carlos Mesa.23 
These new alliances and coalitions demonstrate the emergence of a Bolivian subaltern 
counterpublic, one that challenged the experience of exclusion of the indigenous people 
in the process of national decision making about the resources of the country. Javier 
Sanjinés has argued that in Bolivia ―ordinary people are participating in history rather 
than merely observing it,‖ this unique situation is attributed to the recent development of 
a new ―spatial environment for an alternative public sphere.‖24  From this observation, 
the alternative public sphere is represented by a subaltern counterpublic which has 
functioned to articulate indigenous demands, unite diverse sectors around the issue of 
natural gas, and mobilize groups against Bolivian neoliberal hegemony. Bolivia has an 
                                                 
21 Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford, 1992), 
144. 
22 Perreault 2006, 161. 
23 Perreault 2006, 161; Postero 2004, 207. 
24 Javier Sanjinés C., ―Outside In and Inside Out: Visualizing Society in Bolivia,‖ in The Latin American 
Subaltern Studies Reader. Ed. by Ileana Rodríguez (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 292. 
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extensive tradition of collective organization and protest, the country has a number of 
social groups that have been operating in the city of El Alto since the 1950s. These 
groups form an extensive network that operates through horizontal organization and has a 
sustained history of grassroots action.  
Despite the extensive experience with local organizing, there was a modest record 
of inter-group collaboration prior to the Guerra del Gas.25 The Guerra del Gas 
movement incorporated a number of the existing social groups and built from the 
historical legacy of social struggle in the country.  However, the movement demonstrated 
a distinct break from previous struggles by operating as a subaltern counterpublic; as an 
oppositional public the movement facilitated the formation of new coalitions, 
incorporated innovative forms of social organization, and flexibly represented various 
groups that had previously been excluded from the resource and social struggles.  
Emerging from a subaltern counterpublic contributed to the movement‘s ability to 
build alliances that had not been previously possible or successful. This was made 
possible, in part, by the sustained criticism for the government‘s blatant disregard of the 
indigenous and popular sectors opposing gas privatization. The Guerra del Gas deployed 
its position as a subaltern counterpublic to circulate a counterdiscourse to gas 
privatization, instead promoting nationalization of natural resources. The demands of the 
movement consolidated support for restoring natural resources to the hands of the 
Bolivian people. The Guerra del Gas demanded a referendum to ensure that the voice of 
the people was considered when determining natural gas governance and exportation; it 
also demanded a revision of the national hydrocarbons law to ensure the protection of the 
Bolivian people and nation from outside influence; and finally, the establishment of a 
                                                 
25 Raúl Zibechi, El Alto: A World of Difference, IRC Americas Special Report, 2, http://www.irc-online.org 
(accessed February 7, 2009). 
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Constitutional Assembly in order to rewrite the national constitution.26  The formation of 
these demands facilitated strong relationships across social sectors and played a crucial 
role in the success of the movement. The movement against gas privatization united a 
variegated group that included ―miners, indigenous peoples, farmers, teachers, students, 
and even the national Police.‖27 Sidney Tarrow explains that alliance formation often 
involves crossing a shifting boundary between challengers and members of the polity and 
provides incentives for new movement organizations.28  
The Coordinadora Nacional de Recuperación y Defensa del Gas (NCDRG) 
serves as an example of a new movement organization, and was a prominent facilitator of 
alliance building during the Guerra del Gas.29 The NCDRG, or Coordinadora, 
characterized the movement. The organization worked in tandem with other existing 
social organizations to galvanize popular protest against gas privatization and united a 
broad range of social sectors from all over the country. The Coordinadora was not 
unfamiliar with the challenges associated with organizing to contest the government‘s 
neoliberal policies; the organization was based on a similar coordinating committee that 
was a major asset in mobilizing diverse social groups against water privatization during 
the Guerra del Agua.30  In 2003, the Coordinadora circulated a document called the 
―Manifesto to the Bolivian People‖ which outlined its position as an organization with 
                                                 
26 Perreault 2006, 164. 
27 Suzanne York, "Bolivia's Indigenous Revolution," in Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples' Resistance to 
Globalization , ed. Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 2006), 189. 
28 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 24. 
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Coordinator for the Defense and Recovery of Gas‘ [NCDRG] (see Kohl 2006); although the organization is 
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Translated in English, the organization is called the National Coordinator for the Defense and Recovery of 
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30 Kohl and Farthing 2006, 164; 173. 
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experience and understanding of the resource struggles, and encouraged unity among 
diverse groups and collective action for change: 
The Bolivian people, since April of the 2000, have established with clarity and 
dignity that it is possible to change the conditions of life, that it is possible to 
dispense with and defeat those that until today had decided for us, behind our 
backs and against us, those so-called rulers who are blind, deaf and clumsy before 
the demands of the population. Simple people and workers have begun to write, to 
plan and to construct to a new participatory democracy, one made of 
organizations of the multitudes with collective and horizontal direction, where the 
decisions are made by all, without the leaders or political parties giving us 
permission to do it.31  
Formed to organize against the Chilean option for gas exportation, the organization 
provided a strong critique of the hydrocarbons law and expressed opposition to the 
policies of President Sánchez de Lozada: 
Today, regarding the issue of GAS, the people have rebelled, they are indignant of 
the absolutely unpatriotic and undemocratic management firstly for having 
become aware of the shipment through the hydrocarbons law and decree number 
27,408, in which Sánchez de Lozada has given our hydrocarbons and natural 
resources and property to transnational companies, and secondly, in conspiracy 
with the Chilean oligarchy, he tries to give away our GAS, for the economic and 
military promotion of that country.32  
Building from its initial formation against gas privatization, the Coordinadora eventually 
expanded to take on the task of organizing protest marches and grew into a coalition of 
roughly twenty-one organizations including coca growers, military leaders, union 
representatives, and anti-globalization activists.33 This creation of such a coalition was 
facilitated, in part, by the establishment of the Coordinadora as a tool for organizing and 
                                                 
31 Coordinadora Nacional de Recuperación y Defensa del Gas, ―Manifiesto al Pueblo Boliviano,‖ Trans. 
Tiara Naputi, Observatorio Social de América Latina OSAL 4, no.12 (2003),   
http://www.clacso.org.ar/clacso/areas-de-trabajo/area-academica/osal/publicaciones/revistas/revista-osal-
no-12.  The full text of this document appears in Appendix A & B, the document was numbered by the 
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32 Coordinadora Nacional de Recuperación y Defensa del Gas 2003, Trans. Tiara Naputi, paragraph 2. 
33 Kohl 2006, 320. 
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mobilizing the Bolivian people across diverse sectors in order to defeat the government 
and articulate the demands of the population.   
Since the 5th of September of this year, continuing with the construction of those 
spaces of deliberation and dignity the NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR THE 
DEFENSE AND RECOVERY OF GAS has established itself as a tool that makes 
that task possible, which has been pledged for years, where the leader of 
organization, mobilization and proposals is the Bolivian people.34 
The rhetoric of the Coordinadora solidified its role as a social movement organization 
that created unity through diversity; it called for alliance formation as a means of 
solidifying efforts around natural gas: 
For that reason, from the National Coordinator for the Defense and Recovery of 
Gas we make a political call to all sectors, political parties and leaders of the 
social movements to establish the re-channeling of UNITY around the topic of 
GAS, as the only way to face the certain possibility of including a state of siege or 
self-coup, as has been denounced, UNITY without leaders, establishing a 
horizontal direction, collective, solidarity. The isolated actions, the attempted 
unity with verticalisms and authoritarianisms will only lead the people to the 
precipice and confrontation in unequal conditions, where the people will again put 
their dead.35 
This call was answered by principal political organizations that joined with the 
Coordinadora, including: the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) a coca growers union in Chapare, and the Central 
Obrera Boliviana (COB) a workers federation.36  The participation of these trade unions, 
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political, and labor organizations played a critical role in the Guerra del Gas uprisings 
and the overall success of the movement. Ties were forged with various organizations 
encompassing indigenous leaders and non-indigenous popular sectors. Indigenous 
demands intertwined with questions of livelihood that resonated with other non-
indigenous sectors. Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild explain, ―as protests and riots erupt 
among groups that have long histories of conflict, they stimulate other citizens in similar 
circumstances to reflect more often on their own background of grievance and mass 
action.‖37 The mass action of Bolivian social struggles demonstrated an emerging 
ambiguity between class and ethnicity; the existence of such ambiguity facilitated 
alliances in response to neoliberalism and made it possible for indigenous organizations 
to ―present their rights as a part of broadly defined set of social and political issues (such 
as justice or human rights) that unite popular sectors.‖38 The unique alliances were built 
as a result of the alternative public sphere established by the movement; the 
counterpublic provided a space for discourse about the contentious issue of gas 
privatization, enabled the members to articulate their demands, and contributed to 
creation of a diverse set of strategies and tactics for opposition. 
There was a shared sense among Bolivians that the national gas plan was 
squandering the country‘s natural resources. Natural gas was the primary frame for 
struggle and, as a result, it was easier to build alliances that were catered to the common 
interests of various groups.39 Thomas Perreault argues that several factors conjoined to 
assist the radicalization of politics centered on opposing neoliberalism. These factors 
included the formation of the Coordinadora, the relationships forged across local, labor, 
                                                 
37 Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, "The Impact of Regime on the Diffusion of Political Conflict," in The 
Internationalization of Communal Strife, ed. M.I. Midlarsky (London: Routledge, 1992), 193. 
38 Postero 2005, 83.  
39 Postero 2005, 75.  
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and political sectors, as well as the election of indigenous and leftist political party 
members to Parliament; such issues contributed to the ability of social forces to align in 
order to halt the state supported plan for gas exportation and ultimately led to the 
president‘s resignation. 40 The scope of this essay is not broad enough to investigate each 
of the factors outlined by Perreault in detail; however, the observation of alliance 
building factors does raise questions about the subsequent issues of strategies, tactics and 
leadership of the movement. In the sections that follow these issues will be discussed 
within the context of the 2003 and 2005 uprisings.  
OCTOBER 2003: A DISRUPTIVE UPRISING  
Initially, the Bolivian national government continued to pursue the gas 
privatization option despite widespread opposition toward the plan. Although large scale 
protests and demonstrations persisted against the gas proposal, the government largely 
ignored the demands for resource nationalization. This non-reaction was a strategy of 
control deployed by the Bolivian government; the establishment utilized its resources to 
avoid significant change in its natural gas policy and its overall neoliberal ideology.41 The 
Guerra del Gas was built upon communicative practices that fought to resist the 
dominance of the national government and its avoidance strategies; comprised of people 
characterized by a lack of political power, they relied upon networks of communication 
to challenge existing economic and political discourse. The movement created strong 
communicative ties in spite of its exclusion from the administration‘s neoliberal 
discourse.42   
                                                 
40 Perreault 2006, 161-162. 
41 John W. Bowers, Donovan J. Ochs, and Richard J. Jensen, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control (Long 
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It was able to establish a voice of resistance from a subaltern counterpublic 
sphere, one that not only facilitated discourse among subordinated groups and also 
provided a locus for organizing and mobilizing. From this arena, the movement 
articulated its objection to the neoliberal government as a system of exclusion for 
Bolivian indigenous and poor populations and focused on mechanisms of disrupting the 
state. Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen explain that when advocates for significant social change 
are faced with strong opposition from the establishment, the social movement groups 
must make choices about how to achieve their goals. This involves the development of 
strategies (general choices) as well as tactics (more specific choices guided by the general 
choices).43 Strategies and tactics are important to examine since both ―dictate the 
particular form any rhetorical discourse, action, or event takes.‖44 In 2003, the Guerra del 
Gas focused on tactics of disruption. Sidney Tarrow has argued that when a social 
movement engages in disruption it ―obstructs the routine activities of opponents, 
bystanders, or authorities and forces them to attend to protestors‘ demands.‖45   
The disruption of the Guerra del Gas began in September 2003 when the 
Coordinadora began working with other groups to intensify pressure on the government 
by calling for a nationwide series of civil actions; independently, campesinos were also 
organized from the Bolivian Altiplano region to demand the release of political 
prisoners.46 At that time protests were already a frequent occurrence in El Alto and the 
Altiplano region, and they rapidly spread to the city of La Paz and other rural areas.47  
Then, on September 19, 2003 a march began in Cochabamba which the Coordinadora 
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44 Ibid. 
45 Tarrow 1996, 96. 
46 Kohl 2006, 320. 
47 Kohl 2006, 320; Perreault 2006, 162. 
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later described in its ―Manifesto‖ as an illustration of the organizing and unifying 
capacity of the Bolivian people to take action:   
The first showing of unity and mobilizing capacity was demonstrated the day  of 
September 19th, when more than half a million people, not only in the main cities, 
but in towns and small communities spanning the length and width of the country 
carried out massive marches demanding gas for the Bolivians and 
industrialization.48 
The September marches also coincided with road blockades that began cutting off the 
town of Sorata from the rest of the country.  The Bolivian national government had been 
in denial, it had been avoiding the severity of the protests and the movement‘s solidified 
position against gas privatization—a position rooted in the common identification with 
the experience of oppression at the hands of the neoliberal state.  
The issue of common identity was established through one of the movement‘s 
primary strategies, the strategy of solidification which is used to unite followers and 
includes the rhetorical processes that the agitating group utilizes to reinforce the 
cohesiveness of the membership.49 Tactics associated with the strategy of solidification 
can include slogans, consciousness-raising groups, and expressive and esoteric symbols.50 
According to Robert E. Denton, Jr., ―movements may have several slogans created to 
fulfill specific functions that aim at specific audiences‖ and the use of these slogans can 
―have a great impact upon the success of a movement in terms of expressing ideology as 
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well as membership affiliation.‖ 51 During the Guerra del Gas, several important slogans 
were adopted, such as: ―¡El Gas No Se Vende!‖ (The Gas is Not for Sale!), ―¡Basta!‖ 
(Enough!),52 ―¡El gas es nuestro!‖ (The gas is ours!),53 and ―¡El gas es nuestro, carajo!‖ 
(The gas is ours damn it!).54 These slogans united the Bolivian people against 
neoliberalism, and catered a message to the Bolivian government audience which was 
unsympathetic to the issue of gas nationalization. The slogans were straightforward and 
articulated a major demand of the movement—to end the gas privatization plan, and 
allow the Bolivian people to have a say in the control of the country‘s rich natural gas 
resources. In addition to slogans against natural gas privatization, social movement 
organizations and political groups also crafted slogans to establish common identity and 
send a message of resistance to the government. In October 2003, the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) party gave a press statement containing slogans that articulated 
opposition to President Sánchez de Lozada and his administration: ¡No a la democracia 
de la oligarquía gubernamental!  (No to the democracy of the governmental oligarchy!), 
and FUERA GONI, AHORA (GONI OUT NOW).55 Other organizations, such as the 
CSUTCB, created slogans to denounce the injustice and violence committed by the 
administration and raise consciousness about the indigenous suffering:  
¡¡FUERA EL GRINGO ASESINO DE NUESTRO SUELO SAGRADO!! (OUT 
GRINGO, MURDERER OF OUR SACRED LAND!) 
                                                 
51 Robert E. Denton Jr., "The Rhetorical Functions of Slogans: Classifications and Characteristics," 
Communication Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 11. 
52 Dangl 2007, 117. 
53 Postero 2005, 74. 
54 Susan Spronk, "Reflections on ―Speaking Truth to Power‖: Doing Fieldwork in Bolivia," CERLAC 
Review, http://www.yorku.ca/cerlac/news04-05/ students.htm (accessed March 16, 2009). 
55 Movimiento al Socialismo, ―¡Defender la democracia!‖ Trans. Tiara Naputi, Observatorio Social de 
América Latina OSAL 4, no.12 (2003),  http://www.clacso.org.ar/clacso/areas-de-trabajo/area-
academica/osal/publicaciones/revistas/revista-osal-no-12.  Translated in English, the political party is called 
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). 
 
 48 
¡¡SOBRE LA SANGRE INDÍGENA DERRAMADA JURAMOS RECUPERAR 
NUESTRO PODER!! (OVER SPILLED INDIGENOUS BLOOD, WE SWEAR 
TO RECOVER OUR POWER!) 
¡¡POR LA MEMORIA DE NUESTROS HÉROES TÚPAJ KATARI Y BARTOLINA 
SISA!! (FOR THE MEMORY OF OUR HEROES TUPAJ KATARI AND 
BARTOLINA SISA!!)56 
Such messages were dynamic and full of rhetorical power; as a result they required a 
reaction or response from the Bolivian state.57  
The movement sought a government response and recognition regarding the 
demand for natural gas nationalization; however, state responses do not always entail a 
peaceful concession to the movement. As a movement engages in disruption to gain 
attention from the authorities it is simultaneously enlarging the circle of conflict ―by 
blocking traffic or interrupting public business, protesters inconvenience bystanders, pose 
a risk to law and order, and draw authorities to private conflict.‖58 Despite the potential 
risks, the Guerra del Gas movement engaged in such tactics of disruption as a 
mechanism of forcing the government to consider its demands. During this time, the 
movement utilized blockades as one of its primary disruptive tactics. Creating blockades 
required the obstruction of roads by any and all means possible; blockades were often 
constructed with blankets full of rocks, small bonfires, and other debris such as trash, and 
tree branches.59  The blockades served to literally strangle the flows of economic goods 
and services throughout the country. By blocking roads and access to transportation, the 
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spatial environment of the country was altered. Such change illustrated the spatial 
dimension of the movement‘s disruptive tactics, and provided the opportunity for a chain 
of cultural strategies to be deployed. This offers an example of how the subaltern 
counterpublic was able to transform the traditional terrain of occupation, opposition, and 
resistance; it utilized disruptive tactics and cultural strategies that challenged various 
levels of existing institutional structures.60 The Guerra del Gas defied the government‘s 
attempt to open up the Bolivian economy by literally closing off important cities from the 
rest of the country.  This tactic was particularly effective in not only opposing the gas 
privatization proposal but literally putting the Bolivian economy at a standstill—as a 
landlocked country much of its sectors depended upon transport via main roads and 
highways to facilitate the economic flows.61  With such a grave situation of economic 
disruption on their hands, the administration was forced to respond to the movement.  
 In response to the blockade, military forces were dispatched. The military 
deemed their mission a ‗rescue‘ operation to assist foreign nationals who were trapped 
due to the blockade.62 Security forces traveling to Sorata surprised the residents who were 
participating in the blockade in the town of Warisata. The security forces made no 
attempt to negotiate; instead they opened fire indiscriminately and shot into homes, 
schools, and at unarmed campesinos.63  The confrontation left seven dead, and an 
estimated twenty-five people were reported injured from both sides.  The skirmish 
became known as the Warisata Massacre; instead of quelling the protests, the 
government‘s mission effectively radicalized the demonstrations, igniting a large-scaled 
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campesino resistance.64 Such widespread response was facilitated by the dissemination of 
the news of what had happened in Warisata, the Coordinadora‘s ―Manifesto‖ explained 
the events stating: 
Since that day the sectoral conflicts and the struggle for the recovery have 
intensified and radicalized, there were the first five martyrs over GAS in Warisata 
and the multiple demands of the sectors that reject the present government‘s 
policy of imposition and impoverishment. 
In response to all these protests and signals from the people, the government has 
answered with repression and contempt, this has been added the generally raised 
order for the rulers to leave, which in practice means the loss of legitimacy of the 
current government, in addition there are the latest activities of politicians in 
appointed positions in the state apparatus that demonstrate a  total lack of reality 
with the situation of the country and the indignation of the people against the self-
appointed ―political class.‖65 
This description coincided with a document released by the CSUTCB which called out 
the violent government response and expressed how the massacre in Warisata sparked 
more protests, road blockades, and rallies to be organized against the administration: 
That, after the massacre of Ilabaya and Warisata, all the indigenous intensified the 
Blockades and amassed a Hunger Strike, receiving from Goni‘s butcher 
government, shrapnel after shrapnel, leaving hundreds dead and disappeared, 
sending into mourning the family of the original nations of the Great Qullasuyu 
Marka.66  
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Essentially, Warisata ―galvanized public anger against the Sánchez de Lozada 
administration as well as his gas exportation plan.‖67 The CSUTCB expressed the 
antagonism felt after the massacre, and illustrated the unity of the social movement in 
terms of a unified voice for articulating an overwhelming demand of presidential 
resignation:  
That the indignation has gripped the population, Warisata has been the overflow 
that burst the dam of unrest and contained fury, and a single voice, like wildfire 
travels through all Bolivia: THE RESIGNATION OF GONZALO SÁNCHEZ DE 
LOZADA FROM THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC.68 
In addition to disruption via the blockade, marches offered another important 
tactic of disruption for the movement.69 The marches and demonstrations staged by the 
movement were well organized, with people working together and organizing shifts to 
maintain the massive road blockades and stave off the violent repression forced upon 
them by the state. Because demonstrations can ―spread rapidly from place to place and 
combine many social actors‖70 they were a fitting means of protest for the movement. 
The political demands made by the movement were focused on broader issues than an 
immediate resolution to the gas crisis, they were general demands made on behalf of ‗the 
people‘ and included demands for clarity of coca eradication laws, rejection of harsh 
national security laws, an increase in basic wages, and rejection of free trade 
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agreements.71 The diversity of these demands from a variety of social actors may seem 
unlikely to create unity; however as mentioned above, the strategy of identification 
enabled the Guerra del Gas to weave commonalities through these diverse issues and 
identities within the movement. In addition to slogans, expressive and esoteric symbols 
also represented powerful and interesting agitation artifacts that created common identity 
within the movement.72 An important symbol for the movement was the wiphala—the 
multi-colored Aymara flag that represents the diverse indigenous cultures of the Andes.73 
The Aymara flag is a symbol of indigenous self-determination and was waved alongside 
the Bolivian flag during the Guerra del Gas uprisings. 74  The wiphala expressed the 
importance of indigenous participation in the movement, and also demonstrated the 
overlap between indigenous identities with Bolivian identities.  The combination of the 
Aymara and Bolivian flags illustrated the common characteristics between the indigenous 
and national popular struggles.75 These symbols converged as ―protesters repudiated 
neoliberal government in the name of the nation‖ and demonstrated that the effects of 
neoliberalism could not rupture the country‘s long-standing history of ethnic solidarities 
and proletarian traditions.76 The presence of these symbols and slogans provided 
evidence of a subaltern counterpublic in several ways. First, the use of the flags resonated 
with the indigenous communities as a uniquely indigenous artifact that the state or the 
administration could not control. The flag was a symbol that stood to divide the 
indigenous people from the neoliberal state, and simultaneously unite the indigenous 
groups with other Bolivian sectors that shared the frustration and opposition toward 
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Lozada‘s neoliberal policies. Second, the slogans and symbols exemplified the activist 
community comprised by the Bolivian indigenous peoples, one ―with divergent histories 
and social locations, woven together by the political threads of opposition to forms of 
domination that are not only pervasive but also systemic.‖77 Marcia Stephenson argues 
that the importance of territorial demands as well as issues of self-determination and the 
struggle to achieve autonomy can also distinguish an indigenous counterpublic sphere 
from other types of contestatory publics.78  In this sense, the movement slogans expressed 
both the significance of land as well as autonomous control of Bolivian natural gas 
resources; and this set the Guerra del Gas apart as a subaltern counterpublic. The 
combination of its slogans and symbols were an important and necessary aspect of the 
movement, they united the diverse sectors of the Bolivian population under the banner of 
resistance to neoliberal policies and the injustices of the Lozada administration; and 
ultimately facilitated the movement‘s articulation of demands upon the state. 
As previously mentioned, the protests, blockade, and marches earned the attention 
of the administration, which responded through force.  Police and other security forces 
were dispatched to respond to movement demonstrations, firing tear gas into the crowd, 
using nightsticks, and arrests to quell the protests; however, the more the government 
responded with violent means of repression—the more the Bolivian people resisted.79 
The Bolivian context demonstrates that it is indeed a gamble for an institution to say no 
to a movement, and ―the tactic of denying demands may precipitate and generate 
increased power in the ranks of the dissenting group.‖80 The Warisata massacre certainly 
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resulted in escalating the power of the people in the 2003 uprising; the movement was 
more determined than ever to prevail in ending the gas privatization plan even in the face 
of government sanctioned military violence. 
The movement resistance carried over into October 2003. The Guerra del Gas 
movement developed a historical pact between Bolivian labor and social organizations, 
and ensured protests against the gas exportation would sustained momentum through the 
October uprising. ―Groups normally at odds with each other unified against the gas plan 
and the Sánchez de Lozada administration, paralyzing the country with strikes, marches 
and road blockades.‖81 As citizens mobilized for change in terms of natural gas resources 
they were met with violent repression from the state. The use of violence was an 
escalated response to the demands of the social movement; however, when the strategy of 
suppression through nonviolent means proved to be ineffective the Lozada administration 
felt pressured to devise alternative strategies of social control. The government had 
previously deployed the tactic of denying the agitators‘ demands. However, the simple 
denial of demands presented a great deal of risk for the government—especially when its 
opponent was a rapidly growing social movement that encompassed almost all sectors of 
the Bolivian society. Thus, after attempts to deny the demands of the movement, the 
administration found itself under pressure from foreign embassies to take action against 
the road blockades that were effectively trapping many foreign nationals within parts of 
the country.82 Unfortunately, the movement‘s demands to nationalize the natural gas 
reserves were put on hold as it faced an onslaught of violence responses from the state.   
Violent repression directly contributed to the formation of consciousness and 
embedded the Guerra del Gas in peoples‘ daily routines.  Bolivians experienced 
                                                 
81 Dangl 2007, 124. 
82 Postero 2005, 75; Dangl 2007, 118. 
 55 
harassment, shootings, and imprisonment for their involvement in the movement. Yet, in 
the face of the violent government responses, the resistance became unified and 
radicalized—Aymara campesinos throughout the Altiplano region ―reinforced the road 
blockades and declared strikes in both rural areas and in the cities of El Alto and La 
Paz.‖83 For many of the impoverished Bolivian people there was no choice but to join in 
the struggle, and for the urban workers there was a great deal of sympathy for the 
campesino resistance since they also had a stake in maintaining national control of the 
Bolivian gas reserves.  This common cultural milieu lent itself to collective action in the 
movement and established a conceptual linkage between natural gas and political-
economic and development models; thus, illustrating that the October uprising over 
natural resources represented a broader demand for national resources.84 
  Violence can be understood as a function of the interaction between protesters‘ 
tactics and policing.85 The interactive relation of violence also involves tactical 
adaptations between demonstrators and the police, especially in the face of escalating 
protest repertoires.86 In comparison to other Latin American countries, Bolivia had 
experienced relatively low levels of state violence even under military dictatorships. This 
history was betrayed with successive state sanctioned violence in response to the 
uprising. With the Warisata massacre barely behind them, on October 12, 2003 the 
military killed over 20 people in El Alto and violence again erupted in La Paz on the 
following day.87 The massacres created an enormous outrage that swept the already 
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turbulent country. Additionally, Lozada refused to comment on the deaths of Bolivians in 
El Alto, and had previously commented on the divisive situation of social unrest by 
stating, ―these problems and difficulties are born of what I consider a very radical group 
in Bolivian society that believes they can govern from the streets and not from Congress 
or the institutions.‖88 The violence inflicted by the Lozada administration resulted in 
more than 67 deaths and hundreds of injuries in the months of September and October of 
2003.89 Bolivians were stunned at the administration‘s use of violence in order to repress 
the protests and demonstrations. As Charles Tilly explains ―repressive forces do the 
largest part of the killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to control do 
most of the damage to objects.‖90 This observation holds true for the Guerra del Gas, 
where the repressive Bolivian state regarded demonstrations as potential riots and 
sanctioned the savage repression of the peaceful protesters through the use of military 
and police force.  The Lozada administration resorted to alternative strategies of control, 
moving beyond the tactic of denying the movements‘ demands and into the dangerous 
territory of violent suppression. By authorizing such violent responses, the government 
effectively escalated the efforts of the movement and subsequently faced an onslaught of 
people, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, who poured into the streets to add to the 
list of demands the president‘s resignation.91   
Goni is Gone: Tactics of Adjustment  
The October 2003 public protests demonstrated deep-seated resistance to the 
neoliberal gas proposal; at the pinnacle of these protests the Bolivian President Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada was forced to resign. Prior to his resignation, several actions 
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foreshadowed that the administration was about to reach its breaking point.  On October 
14, 2003 the former head of the government‘s human rights office declared a hunger 
strike and was joined by more than 1,000 others over the next few days; then, on October 
16th over 8,000 miners began a march from the Altiplano to La Paz; finally, the high 
command of the armed forces withdrew support for Lozada which sent the most clear 
signal that his options were limited and his resignation was just around the corner.92   The 
persistence of the movement was eventually successful despite the administration‘s use 
of violence and other control strategies. President Sánchez de Lozada resigned his 
position by October 17, 2003 and was on a flight out of Bolivia that evening.93   
The resignation was widely celebrated and considered a major win for the Guerra 
del Gas. However, the presidential acquiescence did not end the problem of resource 
control in the country. Lozada‘s resignation can be considered a tactic of adjustment by 
the Bolivian government. Although Lozada was forced to resign due to his inability to 
control the country and its increasing social unrest and protests, his resignation indicates 
what Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen (1993) have described as the establishment tactic of 
sacrificing personnel.  The tactic of sacrificing personnel carries risks, as an institution 
can suffer from the temporary vacancy and the legitimate power of the establishment can 
become vulnerable.94 However, this tactic allows the establishment to disrupt the key 
moments of the social movement. Removing the target individual forces the agitative 
group to redirect its energies toward maintaining the movement. 95 Although Lozada‘s 
resignation signaled the achievement of one of the movement‘s principal demands, the 
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movement had to maintain its momentum because there was still the greater issue of gas 
privatization to be reconciled. 
Mesa’s Reign: A Presidency of Empty Pledges 
With Lozada gone from Bolivia, then Vice President Carlos Mesa, assumed the 
presidency; taking on the role of president of a country in chaos. After Carlos Mesa 
assumed the presidency he immediately composed a cabinet of neoliberal technocrats and 
progressive intellectuals.96 Mesa set out to create a broadly inclusive government and 
promised to answer the demands of the protesters.97 His initial speeches immediately 
promised to fulfill three major political demands that the movement articulated during the 
October uprising: 
(1) a referendum on the governance and export of natural gas; (2) passage of a  
revised hydrocarbons law that would be more favorable to the Bolivian state and 
people; (3) the formation of a popularly elected Asamblea Constituyente 
(Constitutional Assembly) to re-write the Constitution.98 
Mesa seemed prepared to give in to the demands; his willingness to adjust to the external 
challenges presented by the movement illustrates the tactic of incorporating the dissident 
ideology. Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen explain that incorporating the ideology of an 
agitative movement into the beliefs of an establishment is a risky and delicate operation, 
particularly because the decision makers must maintain an image of strength.99 Although 
Mesa did not promise a complete reversal of the plan to privatize natural gas, his three 
promises initially indicated a possible reconsideration of the previous administration‘s 
steadfast commitment to neoliberal policies. This shift in the Bolivian government 
signaled a response that the movement had sought after, although it would later to prove 
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to be the establishment‘s tactic of incorporating the movement‘s dissident ideology. 
Given the prevalence of neoliberal hegemony as the driving force for the political and 
economic structures, the Guerra del Gas movement expressed skepticism in response to 
Mesa‘s pledge.  
The movement had been confronted with violence and repression under the 
Lozada administration to which the new president Mesa was associated; after enduring 
such a tumultuous outcome the movement was not about to be bought over with yet 
another promise from a politician. Responding to Mesa‘s promises, the movement 
promised to renew a campaign of demonstrations and blockades if the new president did 
not meet his pledge—especially with respect to the gas nationalization issue.100 Whether 
or not Mesa truly intended to make good on his promises, it was soon discovered that 
putting an end to the gas privatization plan was much more complex than anticipated. 
The difficulty was associated in part with Bolivia‘s need to meet international 
requirements; as Nancy Postero observed, ―the major structural changes demanded by the 
protesters have not been easy to accomplish. Bolivia continues to be bound by the 
conditions of the IMF standby loans, which all for increasing revenue from natural gas 
resources.‖101  Against these barriers, Mesa was unable to immediately scrap the gas 
exportation plan that his administration viewed as a potential source of national revenue. 
Instead, the Mesa government hoped that the national referendum would provide a 
middle ground between the movement and the multinational requirements. 
Mesa organized the national referendum in order to develop a new strategy of gas 
exportation to benefit Bolivia. The goal was that with a revised proposal, ostensibly 
devised from the input of the Bolivian people, Mesa would be able to win over the 
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movement opposition. The binding referendum was to be held on July 18, 2004.102 It 
was said to be an instrument for determining support for nationalization of Bolivian 
hydrocarbons. Although the referendum was one of the demands articulated during the 
2003 uprising, critics argued that the Mesa administration used the referendum as a 
mechanism for sidestepping the issue of gas nationalization; this effectively denied a 
nationalized option for Bolivian voters.103 It was clear to many that Mesa‘s gas 
referendum was not going to meet the goals of the Guerra del Gas movement, the 
referendum was viewed with extreme skepticism and key movement organizations (such 
as the Coordinadora) boycotted the referendum, arguing that it was not fulfilling the 
purpose of direct democracy.104  In addition to the boycott, those who participated in the 
referendum found that the framing of the ballot questions conjured away the option of a 
nationalized system; these factors contributed to an outcome of ambiguous results.105 In 
spite of the ambiguity of the referendum, the Mesa administration proposed to repeal 
Lozada‘s contentious hydrocarbon law and offered to conduct negotiations with the 
multinational corporations in order to balance the profit interests of the country with the 
demands of the movement.106 The move for negotiations signaled a blatant avoidance of 
the issue of gas nationalization, and effectively pushed Mesa‘s government into direct 
conflict with the forces that staged the 2003 uprising.  The Guerra del Gas did not find 
Mesa‘s new proposal convincing at all—many Aymara protesters and trade unions 
argued that the national referendum was a sellout. ―They believed the referendum ignored 
the clear message of the October uprising: that the people want immediate nationalization 
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of the gas wells and a reformulation of the hydrocarbon policy to promote national 
industrialization without export.‖107 The referendum failed to solidify Mesa‘s control 
over the Guerra del Gas movement, his attempt at appeasing the opposition only served 
to plant the seeds for another national uprising against natural resource privatization. 
In January 2005, political polarization began as the debate over Mesa‘s proposed 
Hydrocarbons Law began in the Lower House of Congress.108 Mesa had to confront the 
tension his law created between the interests of multinational corporations and the 
people‘s demand for nationalization; he ultimately showed his support for corporate 
interests by eliminating the progressive members of his newly formed cabinet and 
replacing them with neoliberals that favored a multinational agenda for the country‘s 
natural resources.109 This action confirmed the administration‘s use of postponement 
tactics, which allowed the establishment to avoid unwanted change by stalling on making 
a binding decision on nationalization.110 Mesa was more concerned with cabinet members 
than implementing a gas law that nationalized resources; by changing cabinet personnel, 
Mesa delivered a discursive attack to the opposition movement, one that provided the 
impetus for increased pressure on his administration. Mesa‘s gas proposal was criticized 
for scaring off foreign investment; discarded for not providing enough revenue to the 
natural gas regions; and was opposed by the leftist forces for presenting a solution that 
did not go far enough towards nationalization.111 At this point, the hydrocarbons law was 
at a standstill, as a result the Coordinadora issued a press statement on March 7, 2005 
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calling for another round of mobilizations and demonstrating the strength of the subaltern 
counterpublic to challenge another set of seemingly empty presidential promises:  
The message from Mesa has been clear: he is not willing to continue governing a 
country where the interests of transnational companies are upset, because he 
considers it unfeasible. 
For all the above, the social organizations that are mobilized, we have decided to 
maintain and fortify our mobilization through all the country in demand of the 
approval of the new Hydrocarbons Law including 50% royalties and restituting 
national sovereignty over that resource, the approval of the law calling for a 
Constituent Assembly respecting the proposal of the indigenous and peasant 
movement, and the immediate expulsion of the Aguas de Illimani, also we 
denounce the international cooperation through BM, BID, the IMF, GTZ and 
others are the real cause for seizure in the country by imposing conditions that 
maintain the structure of transnational plunder of our natural resources and our 
companies.112 
The Coordinadora effectively announced an increase in marches and blockades, utilizing 
rhetoric that would solidify the movement‘s renewed calls for national control over 
natural resources. Blockades spread throughout the country, taking place from El Alto 
and Santa Cruz to Oruro, Chuquisaca, Yungas, and Potosí.113 These blockades provoked 
Mesa to threaten his resignation on March 6, 2005.114 On March 15, 2005 the passage of 
the new Hydrocarbons Law through Congress bought Mesa some time, the law appeased 
some of the national-popular bloc that was beginning to disrupt the country by shutting 
down access to most cities. 115  Although the law did not meet the movement‘s demand of 
nationalizing the gas industry, its passage brought blockades to a halt—at least 
temporarily.116 Even after the March blockades had subsided Mesa found himself caught 
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between local demands and multinational requirements, this crossfire characterized his 
shaky control over the country in the months leading up to the May-June 2005 
uprising.117 
MAY-JUNE 2005: BLOCKADING NEOLIBERALISM 
The Mesa government utilized extreme caution toward the gas nationalization 
issue. On May 5, 2005 the new Hydrocarbons Law was finally introduced, it made a 
commitment to recover fifty percent of revenues generated from gas and oil sales.118 The 
new law was met by mass opposition from across Bolivia; it was considered by the 
movement to grant insufficient control of natural gas reserves. 119 The bias that Mesa had 
shown towards the interests of multinational corporations and the obvious stalling on 
passing legislation outraged the Guerra del Gas movement, the law sparked a renewed 
round of protests, demonstrations, and blockades that presented a more radical demand of 
complete nationalization.120 The radicalized demand spread like wild-fire throughout the 
country that set the stage for another uprising. In mid-May the organizing began to 
pressure the administration and senate for hydrocarbons legislation; an indefinite strike 
was declared in El Alto, and communities were mobilized throughout the provinces.121 
―The latest uprising appeared to be a sequel to the insurrection of October 2003, with the 
mobilization of similar sectors, deploying similar tactics, leading to similar scenes in the 
streets of the capital‖122 On May 30, 2005 the streets filled with protestors responding to 
the law, approximately 15,000 people occupied the Plaza Murillo in La Paz. Just two 
days later, factory workers and campesinos led a march through the city of Cochabamba; 
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and a group of Aymara indigenous and other members created a blockade preventing 
access to La Paz.123  The uprising was formed in various parts of the country in a matter 
of days, by June 4, 2005 there were fifty-five blockades spanning the major highways in 
Bolivia.124  The uprising voiced a plurality of demands, some protestors called for a 
human rights trial for the violence that Sánchez de Lozada authorized in October 2003; 
others insisted on a constitutional assembly; many called for Mesa‘s resignation; and the 
most forceful of all the demands was the call for natural gas nationalization.125  
Despite enjoying initial public approval, Mesa realized his control was collapsing; 
although he did not respond to the uprising with suppression strategies, as Lozada had 
done before him, he soon confronted a similar fate as his predecessor. Mesa opted to step 
down gracefully and proposed early national elections; however this solution was 
strongly opposed by the Bolivian political right. National elections would require then 
Senate President Hormando Vaca Díez to renounce his constitutional right to succeed to 
the presidency, a position that he did not want to give up if Mesa resigned.126  
Over the next few days, the uprising entailed not only a plurality of demands but 
also demonstrated variegated tactics of opposition spreading throughout the country. 
Road blockades were numerous and nearly doubled in size by the end of the uprising,  
hunger strikes were implemented in the capital cities and seven other major areas, and 
hydroelectric plants as well as pipeline valves were shut down in a massive barricade to 
the forces of neoliberal policymaking in the country. 127 On June 6, 2005 Mesa resigned, 
signaling his inability to govern in the midst of large-scale social mobilization and the 
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hundreds of protests that were staged during his short term in office.128 Protests 
galvanized on June 9, 2005 as ―tens of thousands of miners and community peasants 
from the western departments of Chuquisaca, Potosí, and Oruro quickly converged on 
Sucre‘s Plaza 25 de Mayo in order to prevent Vaca Díez from succeeding Mesa;‖ the 
Guerra del Gas movement did not support another presidential hopeful from within the 
Mesa administration.129 Vaca Díez represented another round of politics as usual in 
Bolivia, for the diverse sectors of the movement this meant maintaining the structure of 
neoliberal hegemony that excluded the indigenous and the poor from political 
participation. Vaca Díez renounced his constitutional appointment to the presidency in 
the face of the siege on Sucre.130 This left the country in the hands of Eduardo Rodríguez 
Veltzé who called for general elections to be held in December—an act that satisfied the 
Guerra del Gas movement and demobilized the uprising. On June 10, 2005, the 
Coordinadora issued a statement to the people mobilized in Cochabamba and throughout 
Bolivia, offering a reflection of the movement uprising and future directions for Bolivia.  
It is also important to make the following reflection. In this mobilization of May-
June we have seen two things. On the one hand, the gigantic force that the social 
movements are capable of paralyzing the national territory and avoiding the 
maneuvers of the industrialists and the bad rulers. On the other hand: we have not 
been able to impose our decisions and objectives to those same rulers who today 
are in the worst crisis that they can confront. Based on these two considerations 
we have to open up a wide reflection and debate in all the districts and 
communities of Cochabamba and the country, about the necessity little by little to 
construct our own capacity of SELF-GOVERNMENT, to promote it in the next 
mobilization. 
Our immense strength for paralyzing the country must correspond to a great and 
creative capacity to carry out our decisions beyond the official institutions and the 
traditional parties which lead us time and time again to the precipice. In this 
occasion this has started to happen with the occupation of hydrocarbon wells, of 
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the gas plants, the refineries, the next time we must also be able for it to operate 
for the good of us. 
We will continue in an unwavering, irreversible way in this collective horizon laid 
out by the people for years, to construct a country for us, for our children and the 
children of our children.131 
 
With this statement, the Coordinadora highlighted the crucial moment of the 2005 
uprising in the Guerra del Gas movement. Reflecting on the problems of governance and 
national leadership, it provided the final articulation of a demand for political 
participation beyond the ingrained neoliberal ideology. Emerging from the subaltern 
counterpublic sphere, the movement argued for the continuation of collective organizing 
and representation of the Bolivian people within an alternative democracy that the 
previous administration could not provide. The national elections held in December, 
would culminate in a response to the movement‘s call for self-governance and a 
democratic system that represented the people. 
Indigenous Leadership Styles 
The major uprisings of 2003 and 2005 demonstrated a variety of factors 
converging across grassroots organizations and popular sectors of Bolivian society. This 
dynamic lent itself to a diversity of leadership for the Guerra del Gas movement as a 
whole. Instead of a primary leader, several prominent figures occupied positions of 
leadership throughout the movement. According to Jeffrey Rubin, ―collective action is 
simultaneously one of constructing and reconstructing unstable meanings within social 
movements‖ this means that leaders and movement participants are often faced with 
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ambiguity in terms of mobilization and political confrontation.132 This discussion of 
ambiguity is applicable to the Guerra del Gas since the movement did not adhere to a 
traditional organizational and leadership structure. As previously mentioned, the Guerra 
del Gas was a unique movement that illustrated unprecedented alliance building and 
coalitional politics, the unique characteristics also extend to the presence of figure heads 
for the movement that represented different positions within organizations and embodied 
distinct leadership styles.  The Indigenous leaders Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales were 
viewed as movement leaders although both represented different organizations associated 
with the movement and neither maintained any formal leadership roles. Interestingly, 
although it is argued that the Coordinadora was the bedrock organization of the 
movement, its leader Óscar Olivera was not considered as prominent as individuals such 
as Quispe or Morales.133  This could, in part, be related to the connections that both 
Quispe and Morales held within the indigenous political parties of Bolivia. Quispe and 
Morales‘ indigenous identity and political connections resonated with the movement and 
aligned with its objection to the neoliberal government for its stranglehold over Bolivian 
poor and indigenous populations and their systematic exclusion from political decision 
making.134 The movement and its membership equated the indigenous heritage of these 
individuals to their ability to carry out the demands of those excluded from political 
discourse and power.  Embodying leadership styles that were reminiscent of subaltern 
sensibilities (a point I discuss at length in chapter three), these leader figures situated 
themselves in distinctive ways during the movement and as a result their leadership 
continued on separate paths after the final uprising of the Guerra del Gas. 
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Felipe Quispe is often referred to as El Mallku, meaning prince or leader in the 
Aymara language; he served as the General Secretary of the indigenous CSUTCB and 
was an outspoken critic of neoliberalism for the movement.135 Quispe participated in the 
Guerra del Gas protests of 2003 and the blockades in El Alto.136 His leadership style 
relied heavily upon ethnic claims and calls for the formation of a nation that unites the 
Aymara people of both Peru and Bolivia.137 As a leader, Quispe used ethnic tropes and 
metaphors when speaking and constructing his arguments, ―even when accepting the new 
president‘s request for a treaty, Felipe Quispe said the blood would run in the streets if 
their demands were not met, evoking the white/mestizo Paceños centuries‘old fear of 
Indian insurrection and vengeance.‖138 Quispe‘s discourse often referred to the strength 
of the Andean people, he drew from these indigenous cultural references to provide 
support for the project to refound the country—to return Bolivia to its cultural heritage 
based in indigenous perspectives. In 2000, Quispe founded an Indianist political party, 
the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (MIP); this party established Quispe‘s ethnic 
nationalist position that strongly contrasted with that of indigenous leader, and on 
again/off again rival, Evo Morales.139 His position of fervent Aymara nationalism has 
been met by heavy criticism and has been considered to create division of the nation 
which has prevented Aymara-Quechua alliances.140 The mixed reactions to his strategy of 
ethnic nationalism had a negative impact on his attempts at solidifying his leadership role 
beyond the movement. Following the 2005 uprising and Carlos Mesa‘s resignation, 
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Quispe ran for president in the 2005 election; his defeat in the presidential race has been 
attributed to his contentious ethnic nationalist formation.141 In an interview conducted 
just before the December elections, Felipe Quispe spoke of his political party in terms of 
an exclusively indigenous membership: ―In fact, the MIP has no economic resources. It is 
an indigenous, native organization whose only capital is the mobilization of its 
militants.‖142 Quispe isolated his political organization as explicitly Aymara, and singled 
out his former comrade Alvaro Garcia Linera for his membership in the opposition party:  
 So he‘s a traitor who had one foot in our camp, and one foot in the camp of the 
MAS, and he went where that suited him best. He‘s a White, and like all the 
Whites in the past, he has betrayed our people.143 
His discourse reflected a particular ethno-nationalist position by rejecting ―Whites‖ in 
favor of Aymara identity. This focus emphasized identity conflicts in terms of Whites 
versus Aymaras, a move that set Quispe‘s organization apart from other movement 
organizations that focused on a broader criticism of Western ideology while building 
alliances across diverse ethnicities and groups in the struggle for social justice. Finally, 
Quispe described his conflict with Evo Morales in terms of a battle ―...Evo Morales is 
waging war against me, because I am his bad conscience. As soon as he deviates from a 
line in defense of the peasants, I give him no peace,‖ his statement reflected opposition to 
Morales for drifting from a concerted focus on the peasant and indigenous struggles.144 
Ultimately, Quispe‘s attempts to establish an Aymara nationalist position and denounce 
Morales proved to be unsuccessful; the movement‘s other prominent leader figure, Evo 
Morales emerged victorious in the 2005 presidential election.  
                                                 
141 Lazar 2008, 8. 
142 Herve do Alto, ―‘I am the Bad Conscience of Evo Morales‘: Interview with Felipe Quispe,‖ 
International Viewpoint 373, (2005), http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article937. 
143 Herve do Alto, ―‘I am the Bad Conscience of Evo Morales‘: Interview with Felipe Quispe,‖ 
International Viewpoint 373, (2005), http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article937 
144 Herve do Alto, ―‘I am the Bad Conscience of Evo Morales‘: Interview with Felipe Quispe,‖ 
International Viewpoint 373, (2005), http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article937. 
 70 
Evo Morales had been an important Bolivian figure since well before the Guerra 
del Gas. He organized the cocaleros (coca growers) to fight against U.S. imperialism in 
the coca eradication program. During the Guerra del Agua, Morales‘ support of the 
blockades expanded his political platform beyond the cocalero issue to unite a diverse 
popular front against water privatization. The new political party he established, 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) continued his earlier efforts against resource 
privatization and directly focused on the Bolivian people:  
Thus, the poor, the disenfranchised, the marginalized, those who walk on foot, 
those that were always ruled, we have begun to demand and defend our rights. 
From that date, we have recovered dignity to emit our voice, to raise our head and 
say to the powerful: NO! Enough already with the handling and deceit! Enough 
already with neoliberalism! We construct a new national project and provide flesh 
to our democracy!145 
The party declared to be the representative for all indigenous and popular peoples of 
Bolivia.146 In chapter three I detail how the use of ethnic tropes in Morales‘ inaugural 
address provided an appeal to indigenous sensibilities, and illustrated his commitment to 
affirm indigenous ethnicity by legitimizing the axis of difference between the 
subordinated indigenous people and the Bolivian political elite. His proximity to the 
protests and his opposition to neoliberalism helped galvanize popular support.147  
Morales‘ leadership demonstrated a populist style and signified a new power of 
the people that represented ―a public entirely different from that imagined by the 
neoliberal state-led multiculturalism.‖148 Ernest Laclau argues that movement leaders are 
accepted if they present features shared with those they lead, this shared commonality 
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facilitates identification between group members and also holds the leader accountable to 
the community.149 Morales‘ indigenous identity was shared with a great deal of the 
movement‘s membership; this enabled him to participate in the process of mutual 
identification while functioning as a key leader for the group. As a leader Morales was 
considered to represent the people. The explanation of populism provided by Laclau 
indicates that ‗the people‘ should be understood as a relation between social agents that 
provides one way of constituting the unity of the group.150 In a populist configuration 
group unity is articulated through a plurality of demands which construct a broad social 
subjectivity (Laclau 2007, 74); this explanation relates to the subaltern counterpublic of 
the Guerra del Gas movement which articulated popular demands from a broad 
conceptualization of the Bolivian people. The movement had become a nexus for diverse 
interests that engaged the state and international system. It incorporated a broad spectrum 
of opposition including: indigenous and campesinos‘ concern for land access, teacher‘s 
and professional‘s concern for wage increases, protests against rate hikes associated with 
privatization of natural resources, and elderly demands for state support.151 The term 
‗people‘ offered a condensation point for Morales‘ leadership, it enabled individuals of 
different classes, ethnicities, races, and even political views to invest their energy and 
hopes in the movement.152 Morales demonstrated an understanding of the convergence of 
both the Bolivian indigenous and the poor in the creation of a subaltern counterpublic that 
struggled against the state. His populist leadership style had far reaching implications for 
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his continued leadership position within the country. The MAS party, with Morales as its 
leader, emerged after the Guerra del Gas as the defender of indigenous rights and sought 
to avenge the troubled history of oppression and indignities inflicted upon the Bolivian 
people.  
Ending Blockades, Beginning an Indigenous Presidency 
The departure of Lozada and subsequent resignation of Carlos Mesa provide a 
sound example of the power of the Bolivian people and the strength of the subaltern 
counterpublic to craft a discourse that would unite the oppressed people against the 
economic weapons of neoliberalism. Although the Guerra del Gas movement struggled 
to stave off government sponsored brutality, the result of grassroots organizing, marches, 
protests, and blockades were successful in terms of achieving the immediate demand for 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada‘s resignation.  On one hand, the resignation 
signaled a win for the movement by demonstrating that social opposition in the 2003 
uprising had the capacity to achieve concrete gains at the level of national politics. On the 
other hand, the subsequent presidential term under Carlos Mesa presented another round 
of neoliberal policymaking while paying lip service to the demands of the movement. As 
a response to this politics-as-usual, the movement renewed its resistance efforts in 2005 
which led to Mesa‘s resignation.  
Such victories were made possible by the movement‘s emergence from the 
subaltern counterpublic sphere to articulate a counter hegemonic discourse; the 
movement rhetoric resonated with the subordinated and marginalized groups of Aymara 
and Quechua people, and forged ties across distinctive labor groups and economic 
sectors. Coalescing around the issue of natural gas and the demand for political inclusion 
of the indigenous and poor sectors of the country united the people together in uprisings 
that occurred without official leaders or an overarching organizational structure. Even in 
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the absence of concrete movement leadership, the events of the Guerra del Gas left 
Bolivia in need of a new political leadership at the national level. After Mesa‘s 
resignation the country was in search of a leader that understood the movement‘s struggle 
against neoliberal hegemony, represented the indigenous and poor sectors, and could 
provide a force of resistance for change from within the national government.  The 
country would find their leader in Evo Morales. In the chapter that follows, I provide an 
in-depth analysis of the rhetoric of subalterity of Evo Morales, the man who emerged 
from the fragmented political arena that followed the Guerra del Gas to unify the 
remnants of democracy from within the Bolivian presidential office. 
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Chapter 3: Indigenous Rhetoric: Double Vision in Evo Morales’ 
Inauguration Address 
Evo Morales victory in the 2005 presidential election was a landmark event in the 
Bolivian politics. It marked an unprecedented victory for a presidential candidate who 
belonged to the country‘s indigenous community and was of great symbolic importance 
following the Guerra del Gas. The victory signified a shift toward indigenous political 
power and was a herald for the new directions in economic and social policies. As the 
first indigenous leader Morales defied traditional political precedent and established his 
own precedent by opposing the colonial state of government and targeting the neoliberal 
ideology for its stranglehold on the Bolivian economy and people. President Evo 
Morales‘ inauguration speech given on January 22, 2006 presents an insightful example 
of indigenous rhetoric. As explained in chapter one, indigenous rhetoric embodies a 
discourse of subaltern sensibilities and is grounded in subaltern epistemology. In the 
beginning part of his speech, Morales recognizes his location and acknowledges those 
that have helped him along his path to leadership:  
To all the Bolivian people, greetings from here, thanks to my parents, may they 
rest in peace, I am convinced that they continue with me and continue helping me. 
Thanks to God, and to Pachamama for having gave me this opportunity to lead 
the country. To all of you many thanks; thanks to you all I am where I am and  
thanks to the popular movement, to the indigenous movement in Bolivia and the 
Americas. 153 
Here he offers gratitude and respect for the Bolivian people, gives thanks to God and the 
indigenous goddess Pachamama (Mother World), and finally to the indigenous and 
popular movements. From the outset, his discourse provides recognition for the country‘s 
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indigenous roots that have influenced and supported him as well as social movements. 
Additionally, Morales discussed the experience of oppression that has pierced Bolivian 
history; his speech fuses that history together with the present-day struggles and triumphs 
of indigenous people like him:  
This morning, at dawn, with much joy I have seen some sisters and brothers 
singing in the historical Murillo Plaza, the Murillo Plaza like the San Francisco 
Plaza, when 40 to 50 years ago we did not have the right to enter the San 
Francisco Plaza or the Murillo Plaza. For 40, 50 years our ancestors did not have 
the right to walk on the sidewalks. That is our history that is our experience.154  
From these initial statements Morales provides an indication of his subaltern sensibilities 
by focusing on his indigenous experience, recognizing Bolivia‘s history of oppression, 
and acknowledging the contemporary indigenous and popular social movements for their 
sustained efforts. The inaugural address is an important case study for rhetorical scholars; 
it not only contributes to an understanding of Morales‘ outlook on Bolivian politics as 
grounded in indigenous perspectives and utilizing subversive means to achieve its ends, 
but also illuminates a particularly subaltern standpoint emerging from within a political 
arena that had never before experienced such a unique rhetorical style. In combination 
with his rhetoric, Morales‘ actual practice helps bring the concept of the subaltern into a 
new light, justifying the study of his inaugural address as a practical and rhetorical 
artifact that connects subaltern subjectivities to wider political frameworks. The speech 
accomplished these connections by carefully balancing Morales‘ acceptance of the 
position as the first indigenous president of the country, laying the framework for vast 
changes within the country, and establishing a critique of colonialism and the history of 
oppression from the West. An examination of Morales‘ speech-making contributes to 
rhetorical and Latin American scholarship by providing a way of viewing indigenous 
rhetoric that operates as a call for change within national and international politics. 
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This chapter provides an analysis of Evo Morales‘ inaugural address as a unique 
discursive act that deploys indigenous rhetoric to establish an overarching criticism of the 
West and bring the Bolivian subaltern population out of the periphery and into politics.155 
I establish the theoretical frame of indigenous rhetoric by first developing standpoint 
epistemology and then tracing the historical and theoretical underpinnings associated 
with the Aymara theory of ―Both Eyes,‖ de-colonial thinking, and subversive complicity; 
because of their grounding in subaltern perspectives and epistemology each of these 
theories form an integral part of Morales‘ indigenous rhetoric and contributes to a unique 
discourse which integrates indigenous perspectives that have been marginalized from 
Bolivian politics.156 Before examining the indigenous rhetoric in the speech, a brief 
biography of Evo Morales as a rhetor is necessary. In the following sections I provide a 
biographical account of Evo Morales that situates him within the historical-cultural 
background surrounding his election and illuminates his subaltern standpoint. Then, I 
outline in detail the critical perspective of indigenous rhetoric which encompasses 
standpoint epistemology, the Aymara theory of ―Both Eyes,‖ and the theories of de-
colonial thinking and subversive complicity. Finally, I apply this theoretical framework 
to evaluate the indigenous rhetoric at work in Morales‘ 2006 inaugural address. 
Evo Morales: Biography of a Rhetor 
In order to understand Morales‘ indigenous roots, we must consider his 
upbringing and entry into politics. Evo Morales was born on October 26, 1959 in the 
rural community of Orinoca, a Bolivian high plane region inhabited mostly by the 
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indigenous Aymara people who live and work off the land.157 His parents were coca 
farmers who gave birth to seven children, only three of whom survived to adulthood. 
Morales had always spoken his ancestral language Aymara, so when he encountered 
school for the first time he barely understood the Spanish language and after falling 
behind he was forced to quit.158 Later he attended school again, this time at an 
impoverished rural school like many others that were designated for the indigenous 
communities at that time.  
In the 1980s Morales moved to work in the coca fields in the Chapare region of 
Cochabamba; it is here that he began his work as a political and union leader.159 He 
worked with a union of coca growers and quickly advanced to positions of leadership.160 
Morales articulated the demands of the coca union, declaring the need to preserve the 
coca plant which has been used among the Aymara and Quechua populations of Bolivia 
for centuries. The practice of using the leaves for medicine, religious offerings, and 
sustenance continues today; coca is vital to the traditional lifestyle and social rights of the 
indigenous population.161 However, coca is not viewed as a social right by everyone; 
previously, United States‘ coca eradication efforts targeted Bolivia to quell its production 
into cocaine and subsequent use in the U.S. The Bolivian government cooperated with 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), leaving the coca unions to struggle against an 
institutional partnership that was destroying the only source of income and cultural 
heritage for the Bolivian indigenous people. Morales met with government officials to 
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represent the union‘s resistance to coca eradication policies. In the mid-1990s Morales‘ 
opposition culminated in his leadership to transform the Instrumento Político por la 
Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP), a united organization of farmers and indigenous people, 
into a national political organization called the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).162 After 
founding MAS, Morales was elected as the party‘s representative to the Bolivian 
National Assembly. During his first year in Congress he defended the coca plant as a 
sacred symbol of sovereignty for the Bolivian indigenous people. He spoke out against 
the DEA‘s military enforced eradication efforts, and spoke in favor of an indigenous 
armed resistance of the eradication troops.163 Morales‘ actions solicited a warning from 
Bolivian high authorities, and culminated in his removal from Congress in January of 
2002. This expulsion was later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 
Tribunal.164  
By November of 2002, Morales returned to the political scene as the MAS 
presidential candidate; the party took second place losing by a very small margin.165 
Following the 2002 election Bolivia suffered turbulent national leadership as Sánchez de 
Lozada and then Carlos Mesa struggled to govern in the midst of the Guerra del Gas 
uprisings; this forced early general elections in December 2005.166 When Morales 
campaigned again for president, his platform focused on nationalization of Bolivia‘s 
natural gas reserves and relations with the United States. He overtly opposed the U.S. 
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government, and separated himself from other candidates by situating the MAS party as 
representing the voice of the disadvantaged and the only one concerned with reducing 
social conflicts.167 Morales countered the other candidates‘ expensive campaigns and 
publicity by attending indigenous events to receive blessings and free media coverage; at 
these events, he openly expressed opposition to the United States and neoliberalism. 
By focusing on the Bolivian indigenous population, the issue of natural gas 
nationalization, and critiquing neoliberal policies Morales‘ campaign resonated with the 
Bolivian populace that organized and struggled during the Guerra del Gas movement. 
His campaign strategy succeeded and won the election with a landslide victory. The voter 
turnout rate was the highest it had been in any Bolivian presidential election; at 84.5% it 
was certainly an indication that the public supported Morales‘ re-entry into politics.168 As 
chapter two explained, Bolivian politics in the years preceding Morales‘ election were 
characterized by tumultuous leadership, government violations of the constitution, and 
military coups. Advocating for change, Morales‘ victory challenged the history of 
corruption and faltering democracy. His leadership presented a major break from past 
Bolivian presidents: he was the first president elected by popular vote, the first to 
represent a non-traditional political party, and the first president elect with a primarily 
indigenous ethnic background.169 This historical-cultural context of Bolivian politics 
created the backdrop from which Morales emerged to present his inaugural address.  
A day before his congressional inauguration, Morales participated in an 
indigenous ceremony held at the pre-Inca ruins of Tiwanaku. An estimated 25,000 
supporters were in attendance as Morales was blessed by Aymara priests, a symbol of his 
recognition as the leader for Bolivia‘s indigenous peoples. Morales was barefoot and 
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dressed in traditional clothing.170 He exuded a style that aligned him with the Bolivian 
indigenous people.171 This personal style reinforced his subversive image and persona; 
his manner of dress reflected his indigenous heritage and symbolized his refusal to 
succumb to the outside culture of the West.172 
On Sunday, January 22, 2006, the day after his indigenous ceremony, Morales 
gave his inauguration address. The audience included political leaders from Spain, Brazil, 
Venezuela, and a representative from the European Union; he spoke directly to the 
―international press,‖ an indication that his speech was being delivered to a wide ranging 
audience beyond the foreign dignitaries who were present.173 He also spoke directly to 
indigenous brothers, the people who had joined the MAS party, the Andean people, as 
well as the participants of the Guerra del Gas who represented the popular and 
indigenous social sectors.174 His speech concentrated on conveying a message to a 
comprehensive audience—to all Bolivian people, Latin America, and the broader 
international arena.175 Insofar as Morales' success came from the political participation of 
marginalized peoples, his indigenous rhetoric can be helpfully read as a discourse of 
subaltern sensibilities. It is to the concept of indigenous rhetoric that I now turn.  
                                                 
170 Tom Hennigan, ―Leader takes power from earth god on ancient site,‖ The Times (London), January 23, 
2006, https://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,11069-2005124,00.html. 
171 At the congressional inauguration Morales wore another traditional garment, a striped alpaca sweater, 
which he also wore in early 2006 during his diplomatic tour to visit with European leaders (see Spiegel 
Online, ―Indian, coca farmer, Bolivian president‖ May 2, 2006) 
172 Marcela Sanchez, ―What’s in a Tie? Evo Morales Raises the Question,‖ The Washington Post, January 
13, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/12/AR2006011201138.html. 
173 BBC News, ―Bolivia's new leader vows change‖ January 22, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/americas/4636190.stm. 
174 Morales 2006, Trans. Tiara Naputi.  See Appendices C & D, paras. 1, 4, 5, & 12. 
175 Despite the intentionally broad scope of Morales’ audience, the transcript for his address is only 
available in Spanish; although excerpts of his speech have appeared in English news sources (see BBC 
News), the immediate international audience was limited to those individuals who could speak or read 
Spanish fluently.  
 81 
‘SEEING’ INDIGENOUS RHETORIC: MORALES’ DOUBLE VISION  
In chapter one I introduced the concept of indigenous rhetoric as a discourse of 
subaltern sensibilities. In this section I establish the theoretical frame of indigenous 
rhetoric and employ the term subaltern that was discussed in the introduction. This 
chapter avoids the danger of logocentrism described by Spivak; rather than attempt to 
describe the indigenous culture from my own standpoint as a scholar influenced and 
trained in Western traditions, the focus here is upon Morales‘ standpoint and utilizes his 
discourse as an embodiment of the subaltern condition.176  Morales does not attempt to 
speak for the indigenous people but rather speaks from the perspective of the subaltern, 
identifying himself as Aymara he positions himself among the indigenous subaltern 
population in Bolivia. 
By speaking from the perspective of the subaltern, Morales exemplifies 
standpoint epistemology which is considered to be an organic way of perceiving the 
world that ―can rise whenever oppressed people gain public voice.‖177 Standpoint 
epistemology challenges us to see and understand the world through the eyes and 
experiences of the oppressed and applies the vision and knowledge of the oppressed to 
social activism and social change; it is both an approach to knowledge construction and a 
call to political action.178 The vision and knowledge that Morales‘ speech provides in 
terms of Bolivian politics can be better understood through the lens of standpoint 
epistemology and will be explored in conjunction with the Bolivian indigenous theory of 
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―Both Eyes.‖ Javier Sanjinés proposes that the Aymara theory of ―Both Eyes‖ offers a 
new way to see through subaltern sensibilities; and provides a double vision which must 
come ―from the perspective of subalternity, from decolonization, and therefore from a 
new epistemological terrain on which the Other‘s way of seeing works.‖179 In the sections 
that follow I establish the theoretical framework of the theory of ―Both Eyes,‖ and posit 
the combined theories of ―de-colonial thinking‖ (Mignolo 2007, 46), and ―subversive 
complicity‖ (Grosfoguel 2003, 9) to enrich and complicate the theoretical perspective for 
analyzing Morales‘ inaugural address. I argue that these theories work in tandem, and 
their convergence provides a means of viewing the indigenous rhetoric that Morales‘ 
discourse evinces. This theoretical framework illuminates Morales‘ perspective of 
subalterity and demonstrates a sort of double vision offered in his speech. 
The first concept in the theoretical framework is the theory of ―Both Eyes‖ the 
history of which relates back to the Peasant-Military Pact that codified military control 
over much of the Bolivian countryside, maintaining militaristic dominance over the 
indigenous people and their lands until the 1970s. When the pact ended numerous 
autonomous indigenous organizations emerged for the first time.180 The most significant 
was Katarismo which focused on recovering Aymara identity and used the Aymara 
theory of ―Both Eyes‖ to challenge the historical linkage of indigenous peasants to the 
state (through trade unions and peasant militia movements, particularly in the Quechua 
zones around Cochabamba).181 By promoting a specifically indigenous identity, the 
movement challenged the single-eyed view of mestizaje, the process of indigenous and 
Spanish intermixing in order to create a synthesis of both racial and national dimensions 
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that has expressed the ideal image of the nation since the mid-twentieth century.182 
Through its opposition to the singular mestizaje perspective, the Katarismo movement 
recuperated the second eye that had been blinded against looking back on the anti-
colonial struggles of the past; the second eye recovery entailed a reintegration of the 
colonial past into reflections on the present and a confrontation of the singular Western 
perspective.183 The second eye concept was promoted by university educated indigenous 
intellectuals who argued that Bolivia could never be successfully understood as long as 
the perspective of the mestizo-criollo sector continued to impose its single eye of 
reason.184 Thus, Katarismo is credited with perceiving the continuity of colonialism that 
characterizes the other side of modernity, and seeing that politically the Aymara formed a 
national ethnic majority; these two significant ideological achievements provide the lens 
for understanding subaltern consciousness,  an issue that will be returned to in later 
sections of this chapter.185  
De-colonial thinking is the second concept that converges within the theoretical 
framework; it offers an-other critical theory, an-other epistemology that emerged from 
the critical foundation in Latin America established by José Carlos Mariátegui in the 
1920s, and spread dependency theory and philosophy of liberation through Latin America 
in the 1970s. The concept traces back to indigenous populations such as the Quechua and 
Aymara—it has historically been a perspective adopted by the indigenous people and has 
emerged as an indigenous strategy in contemporary Bolivian politics. For Walter 
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Mignolo, de-colonial thinking involves rupturing the foundation of Western concepts and 
accumulation of knowledge in order to create an epistemic shift among the people who 
have been oppressed by Western imperial history.186 The concept is also explained as 
requiring a dual strategy of ―unveiling the logic of coloniality‖ and ―de-linking from the 
totalitarian effects of Western categories of thoughts and subjectivity.‖187  Mignolo draws 
from Bahktin‘s concept of dialogism which formulates discourse as double-voiced and 
capable of accounting for someone else‘s words, and argues that language provides the 
capacity for looking through the eyes of another.188 It is a colonial subaltern epistemology 
that is anchored in double consciousness.189 For Javier Sanjinés, double consciousness 
refers to the ―epistemology from which the colonized thinker learns the consciousness of 
the colonizer and the colonized at once, while the colonizer only knows his [sic] own 
monotopical consciousness and can only visualize events from his [sic] own, exclusive, 
Eurocentric perspective.‖190 This understanding of double consciousness is very similar 
to W.E.B. DuBois‘ notion of the same term, which is explained as the sense of always 
looking at one‘s self through the eyes of others, of feeling an ever present two-ness.191 
Such two-ness can be seen in the double world in which the indigenous lived (and lives) 
in Latin America.192 The explanation of double consciousness provided by both Sanjinés 
and DuBois directly connects with de-colonial thinking in the Bolivian context. Morales‘ 
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inaugural address brought the approach of de-colonial thinking to the forefront by 
representing a rupture with Western imperialism in favor of supporting oppressed 
peoples, and offering an epistemology grounded in subaltern experiences. The events that 
culminated in his electoral victory demonstrated ―some of the most visible signs today of 
the de-colonial option.‖193 If de-colonial thinking is grounded in double consciousness, 
understood as a necessary condition for subaltern subjectivities to challenge the singular 
perspective of colonialism, then it is particularly salient for exploring the indigenous 
rhetoric of Morales‘ inaugural address. 
De-colonial thinking closely relates to subversive complicity with the system, the 
third concept of the theoretical framework, which is concerned with the representation of 
hybrid, transcultural forms of knowledge that intersect the traditional and the modern.194 
Subversive complicity is a de-colonial theory that functions as a form of resistance to 
dominant knowledge forms, challenges Eurocentric rationality, and places subaltern 
subjectivities at the center of the process of knowledge production. Specifically, Ramón 
Grosfoguel explains: 
[t]he strategy of subversive complicity would imply the radical resignification of 
the symbols of U.S. hegemonic discourses in the region such as democracy, civil 
rights, and equal opportunities. This means using a democratic discourse rather 
than a socialist discourse, but resignifying it in a radical democratic direction. 
This is subversion from within the dominant discourses.195  
By resignifying dominant symbols and centering the Bolivian indigenous subaltern, 
Morales‘ speech exemplifies the strategy of subversive complicity with the system. His 
address demonstrated subversive complicity by focusing on the indigenous population as 
the Bolivian subaltern:  
                                                 
193 Mignolo, ―The De-colonial Option,‖ 46. 
194 Ramón Grosfoguel, Colonial Subjects: Puerto Ricans in a Global Perspective (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003), 20. 
195 Ibid., 72. 
 86 
We are obligated to perform a great reminiscence about the indigenous 
movement, about the situation of the colonial period, about the republican period 
and the period of neoliberalism. Indigenous peoples – who are the majority of the 
Bolivian population, so that the international press and guests know, according to 
the latest census of 2001, 62.2% are Aymaras, Quechuas, Mojeños, Chipayas, 
Muratos, and Guaraníes. These people, we have historically been marginalized, 
humiliated, hated, unappreciated, and condemned to extinction. That is our 
history; they never recognized these people as human beings, that these people are 
absolute owners of this noble earth, of its natural resources.196  
Morales‘ perspective enables the Bolivian subaltern to be seen; his language draws 
attention to the indigenous subjects and criticizes their marginalization to the periphery. 
Beginning from the perspective of subalterity, President Evo Morales‘ inauguration 
address clears a new terrain operating from standpoint epistemology to encompass de-
colonial thinking and subversive complicity; these theories combined serve as Morales‘ 
double vision that grounds his indigenous rhetoric. Now that the theoretical framework of 
indigenous rhetoric has been explained as a discourse of subaltern sensibilities that 
emerges from the convergence of the theories of ―Both Eyes,‖ de-colonial thinking, and 
subversive complicity, I shift toward an application of this theoretical approach to 
Morales‘ inaugural address. 
De-colonial Thinking: Seeing from the Mind’s Eye(s) 
Morales‘ inaugural address was structured in terms of remembering the past, 
outlining the present, and looking to the future. He wove the history of indigenous 
discrimination into the present and unfolded the future for Bolivia by creating 
expectations of change in the audience. He detailed the historical marginalization of 
indigenous people by recounting the discrimination that the indigenous had faced: ―for 
40, 50 years our ancestors did not have the right to walk on the sidewalks. That is our 
history that is our experience.‖197 He also traced the origins of the indigenous movement 
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and praised the efforts of the movement to unite the people in the struggle against 
injustice and discrimination: 
This original indigenous movement is not granted by anyone; no one has given it 
to us, it is the consciousness of my people, of our people.  
 
…and all sectors have worked to end that injustice, to end that inequality, and 
above all to end the discrimination, the oppression, that we have been subjected as 
Aymaras, Quechuas, and Guaraníes.198 
In these examples Morales incorporated the historical record of coloniality in Bolivia and 
promoted a specifically indigenous identity. Using ‗we‘ terminology he inserted himself 
among the indigenous peoples like the Aymara and Quechua, this discursive move 
solidified his identity as an indigenous leader.  His use of terms such as ―our‖ and ―us‖ 
functioned to situate himself within the indigenous identity category and provided a 
means of uniting the indigenous population. This temporal and identity development 
organized Morales‘ inaugural address around a shared indigenous experience—the 
sharing of integrally related experiences is fundamental to achieve an understanding the 
Bolivian situation, a point that will be explored further in the discussion of Morales‘ 
strategy of subversive complicity.  
Early in the speech Morales demonstrated his double-eyed view by recalling the 
anti-colonial struggles of individuals such as Túpac Katari, Simon Bolivar, and Che 
Guevara, who fought for justice and equality in Latin America: 
 
We can continue speaking of our history; we can continue remembering how our 
ancestors fought: Túpac Katari fought to recover the Tahuantinsuyo, Simon 
Bolivar who fought for this great homeland, Che Guevara who fought for equality 
in a new world.  
That cultural democratic struggle, this cultural democratic revolution, is part of 
the struggle of our ancestors; it is the continuation of Túpac Katari‘s struggle; that 
struggle and these results are the continuation of Che Guevara. Hence we are 
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sisters and brothers of Bolivia and of Latin America; we shall continue until 
securing such equality in our country. 199  
Through the references made to these Latin American icons the speech recuperated the 
colonial past, provided evidence for the authority of past activists, and incorporated 
reflections on the present by sharing the value of continuing in their footsteps. By 
recalling Túpac Katari as a revolutionary figure, Morales resonated with the Katarismo 
movement and established the backdrop for his double-eyed perspective of subalterity 
within his inaugural address. 
Morales‘ speech created a stark contrast between his viewpoint of ―Both Eyes‖ 
and the single-eyed Western perspective; this is evidenced by his allusion to the 
culturally familiar legend of Sacaojos (Eye-stealers). This popular Central and South 
American legend has evolved into a contemporary tale that cautions against foreigners by 
arguing that foreign individuals have come to kidnap children and gouge out their eyes in 
order to sell these body parts overseas for a lucrative profit. The legend of Sacaojos 
relates to the Lik‘irichi legend of the native Andean cultures that is considered to have 
originated prior to the 17th century Spanish Conquest, and represents the ―other‖ (read 
non-indigenous) in exclusively negative terms.200 In the inaugural address Morales used 
―Both Eyes‖ to tell the story of indigenous oppression while alluding to the cautionary 
tales of foreigners, the Sacaojos, who threaten the native population. One example he 
provided is given in terms of education, and the foreign threat to indigenous learning: 
I want to tell you, so that the international press knows the first Aymaras, 
Quechuas that learned to read and to write, had their eyes removed, their hands 
cut off so that they may never again learn to read or to write. We have been 
subjected, now we are looking for a way to solve that historical problem, but not 
with revenge, because we are not spiteful.201 
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On a cultural level, the indigenous peoples were threatened by outsiders; their bodies 
were subjected to brutality in order to perpetuate both their physical and intellectual 
marginalization. In the excerpt above the word ―looking‖ illustrates Morales‘ attempt to 
use ―Both Eyes.‖ As an Aymara child he struggled to learn Spanish and while attending 
an impoverished rural school, he had seen the work of intellectual marginalization and 
had shared the difficult educational experience with other Bolivian indigenous people. 
His discourse reflected subaltern sensibilities and sought to recover the stolen eye(s) of 
from the forces of oppression and marginalization.  The speech continued to criticize the 
state of indigenous education, and referred to the intellectual marginalization that 
relegated indigenous education to darkness: 
 Imagine, rural schools called sectionals, without light. We are in the third 
millenium, that I remember where I was born, where for the first time I went to a 
sectional school, two years ago it reached the light, but in other sectional schools 
such as Acunami, Chivo, Rosapata, Arcorcaya, there is still no light.202 
 Morales‘ discourse here demonstrated that without light the rural schools are blinded, 
they are left in the dark periphery and excluded from the single-eyed gaze of the West. 
His speech continued to challenge the peripheral exclusion of the Bolivian people by 
remembering the forgotten history of colonial oppression, a history that spans across five 
centuries.  Understanding colonial oppression as five hundred years old may seem out of 
place considering the Bolivian country has been in existence for less than two hundred 
years.203 However, ―the identification of the sixteenth century as the beginning of 
modernity/coloniality is…something that is ingrained in a different colonial experience. 
Indigenous movements also have been emphasizing, lately, the five hundred years of 
colonization.‖204  The focus that movements have directed toward temporal 
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classifications of oppression parallels Morales‘ discussion of the 500 years of resistance 
and oppression of indigenous peoples. The temporal references to oppression are 
significant for understanding Morales‘ indigenous rhetoric not only as a de-colonial 
project but also as exhibiting his specific vision from subaltern sensibilities:    
And I want to say especially to the indigenous brothers of America concentrated 
here in Bolivia: the campaign of 500 years of popular black-indigenous resistance 
has not been in vain; the campaign of 500 years of popular indigenous resistance 
started in 1988 and 1989, has not been in vain.205 
We are here to say, enough with the resistance. For 500 years of resistance and 
the takeover of power for 500 years, indigenous people, workers, and all sectors 
have worked to end that injustice, to end that inequality, and above all to end the 
discrimination, the oppression, that we have been subjected as Aymaras, 
Quechuas, and Guaraníes.206 
In these instances, Morales exemplified de- colonial thinking by speaking about the 500 
year history of resistance and oppression. The examples drawn from the inaugural 
address demonstrate his indigenous rhetoric was an embodiment of subaltern sensibilities 
in terms of its ability to see with ―Both Eyes‖ and engage in de-colonial modes of thought 
to challenge marginalization and oppression in Bolivian society. His speech unveiled the 
logic of coloniality, further aligned with the Bolivian indigenous people, and posited 
himself against the West—an act that illustrated consciousness from within his position 
of subalterity.  
Subaltern Consciousness: A Double Understanding 
In this section I return to the issue of standpoint epistemology that was briefly 
mentioned in the above discussion on indigenous rhetoric. Standpoint epistemology 
offers a way to empower oppressed groups by attributing value to their experiences and a 
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point of departure for developing oppositional consciousness.207 This consciousness is 
characteristically subaltern and refers to awareness, a way of knowing and representing 
from the perspective of indigenous consciousness.208 From this understanding of 
standpoint epistemology, I argue that the theory of ―Both Eyes‖ works in conjunction 
with standpoint epistemology to present lenses for viewing subaltern consciousness 
operating within Morales‘ inauguration address. In the Bolivian context, ―subaltern 
consciousness turns…mestizaje upside down, Aymaras invert Europe with their rewriting 
of ethical and political issues, thus decentering and displacing the instrumental logic that 
guides social sciences and positivist thought.‖209 Morales‘ expressed subaltern 
consciousness through his consideration of the indigenous population as a national ethnic 
majority with political power and his recognition of the colonial influences that persist in 
contemporary society; such discursive moves provoked a displacement of instrumental 
logic and pushed the Bolivian indigenous people into the center of political issues.  
Morales also explicitly mentioned consciousness in several parts of the speech. First, he 
stated that the indigenous movement is ―the consciousness of my people, of our 
people,‖210 then he argued that ―the outcome of the national elections is, precisely, the 
combination of social consciousness with professional capacity,‖211 and finally he 
declared that government corruption has ―been limited and ended thanks to the 
consciousness of the Bolivian people.‖212 Linking consciousness to indigenous 
mobilization, Morales signaled the power of the Guerra del Gas movement to influence 
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and transform contemporary Bolivian thought.213 His speech argued that such 
transformative power emerged from the consciousness of the indigenous people within 
the movement and could expand to include a broader Bolivian and international 
consciousness:  
We must recognize that those mistaken, wrong, selfish policies, have auctioned 
off natural resources, and privatized basic services. This forced there to be a 
consciousness of the Bolivian people.214  
And we would truly want, truly, for there to be not only national but international 
consciousness.‖ 215 
The accounts of consciousness provided by Morales demonstrate de-colonial thinking 
operating within his speech. Grounded in consciousness, de-colonial thinking also 
combines oppositional strategies that confront the totalizing effects of Western thought. 
Thus, subaltern consciousness brings an awareness that enables the West to be unlinked 
from the indigenous experience. As consciousness provides a clear view of the 
destructive facets of Western ideology, it exposes change as a means of providing the 
necessary opposition to Western influence. Morales develops an argument for change in a 
variety of ways throughout the speech, the first use of ―change‖ is posited in relation to 
an alluded figure of the West: 
Bolivia appears to be South Africa. Threatened, condemned to extermination, we 
are here, we are present. I want to tell you all that there are still remnants of those 
people who are the enemies of indigenous peoples, we want to live on equal terms 
with them, and for that reason we are here to change our history.216  
By comparing contemporary Bolivia to South Africa, Morales uses the Bolivian historical 
plight and present-day situation to call for a break with the historical narrative and change 
for the future. Here, Morales relies on the consciousness of the people to move toward 
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supporting change, by relating the negative history of oppression his discourse resonates 
with the awareness of the indigenous people. His call for change entails a break from the 
relationship between the indigenous people and the West. De-colonial thinking starts this 
process of unlinking, simultaneously moving the indigenous people out of the periphery 
of the West while re-connecting them in the center. 
Subversive Complicity: Resignifying from Margin to Center 
As explained above, subversive complicity entails a resignification of dominant 
symbols and places subaltern subjectivities at the center of the process of knowledge 
production. From the outset of the inaugural address Morales demonstrated subversive 
complicity by calling upon the international community to focus attention on subaltern 
issues. Morales directed international attention to Bolivia, on three other occasions he 
singled out his international audience:  
I want to tell you, so that the international press knows the first Aymaras, 
Quechuas that learned to read and to write, had their eyes removed...217  
We are here in democracy, and I want you to know, especially the international 
community...218  
We would like to resolve these issues, not only with the participation of 
Bolivians, but also with international cooperation.219  
With these statements Morales invited the international audience to share his perspective 
and to recognize the Bolivian subaltern situation. The subaltern standpoint is the locus 
from which the international community is educated in the inaugural address; Morales‘ 
discourse situates the Bolivian subaltern at the center and encourages the broader 
international community to accept his view, his (re)placement of subaltern subjectivities. 
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Through subversive complicity, the speech enables Morales to recover indigenous 
subjectivities from the dark margins of Bolivia‘s repressive history. 
Subversive complicity also involves the resignification of the symbols of U.S. 
hegemonic discourses such as democracy and equal opportunities.220 Specifically, 
Morales‘ motif of sight allowed for the symbol of and democracy to be re-envisioned and 
exposed the symbol of neoliberalism to a scathing critique. In order to counter these 
hegemonic symbols, Morales confronted the former Bolivian government head on and 
challenged the Western economic model that his campaign opponents supported for 
Bolivia. He first argued against energy privatization stating, ―the fights for water, coca, 
and natural gas have brought us here sisters and brothers. We must recognize that those 
mistaken, wrong, selfish policies, have auctioned off natural resources, and privatized 
basic services‖ and then expressed how he could not ―understand how the former rulers 
privatize the basic services especially water. Water is a natural resource, without water 
we cannot live, therefore the water cannot be of private business, from the moment that it 
is private business human rights are violated.‖221  
After turning his critical eyes to energy privatization Morales took issue with the 
problem of land distribution in the Bolivian economic system:  
Constitutionally speaking, the large estate is unconstitutional. Lamentably due to 
interests of powerful groups the large estate exists. How it is possible that there 
are large estates? How is it possible when some sectors suggest they need 20, 30, 
40, 50 hectares to raise a cow, which cow would need to have 50 hectares? That is 
part of an unconstitutional economic model.222  
Chastising energy privatization and unconstitutional land policies provided the 
foreground for Morales‘ broader criticism of the neoliberal model: 
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We have seen closely the products from the application of the neoliberal model. 
The State spends money so that a young person, whether from a rural area, or the 
city can be a professional; a family spends money so that their child can be a 
professional, they are a professional, and there are no jobs, so that professional 
must think about Argentina, the United States or Europe. Nowadays that young 
person who goes away to Europe cannot find a job, professional or 
nonprofessional. How many relatives of yours are there, if not in Argentina, in the 
United States, in Europe? How many of our neighbors, sisters and brothers are the 
product of the application of the neoliberal model? That is the law of 
capitalization; those are the politics of auction, of plundering our natural 
resources.223  
Morales‘ criticism of the neoliberal economic model brought the underside of 
capitalization policies to light. His perspective challenged the notion that neoliberalism 
equates to economic justice by exposing the adverse outcomes of such policies, which  
have resulted in the plundering of Bolivian natural resources and the subjugation of its 
people to unsustainable foreign institutions. To complete the strategy of subversive 
complicity, Morales resignified the neoliberal symbol by envisioning change: ―I believe 
even still, we have the responsibility to settle these social, economic and historical errors, 
that together we can all better change and correct those errors surely implemented by 
foreign institutions.‖224 Morales also resignified the symbol of democracy. His discourse 
represented subversive complicity with the system in various ways. First, it labeled the 
previous government corrupt and undemocratic, and then it argued that the previous 
actions of Parliament resulted in auctioning off the country and dividing the resources 
among an elite few:  
Before there was talk of democracy, democracy was constantly fought for; there 
was talk of a pact for democracy, a pact of governability. The year 1997 when I 
arrived at this Parliament that I have seen personally, no pact for democracy or 
governability, but pacts of corruption, pacts of how to make money from where 
and how…225 
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 They left us a divided country, a divided State, an auctioned off country. I am 
almost convinced: if they had been intelligent administrators of the State, if they 
had wanted this homeland, loved this homeland and not as some people who only 
want a homeland to plunder and make themselves rich, if there had really been 
responsible people to handle loving this homeland, its people, Bolivia would be 
better than Switzerland.226 
Morales‘ discourse marks democracy as a symbol polluted by the dominant narrative of 
the elitist Bolivian government which showed little concern for the people; this critical 
perspective towards the government was shared by the general population whom had just 
experienced turbulent and violent national leadership during the preceding resource wars.  
Morales subverted the tainted views of governance by offering a different symbol of 
democracy that envisioned connecting with the Bolivian people through political 
struggle: ―that cultural democratic struggle, this cultural democratic revolution, is part of 
the struggle of our ancestors… Hence we are sisters and brothers of Bolivia and of Latin 
America; we shall continue until securing such equality in our country.‖227 Morales‘ 
vision of political struggle and his determination to relate to the Bolivian people offered a 
newly signified symbol of democracy grounded in change:  
We are here in democracy, and I want you to know, especially the international 
community, that as our vice-president of the Republic said in a conference: we 
want to change Bolivia not with bullets but with votes, and that is the democratic 
revolution.228  
The above excerpts illustrate Morales‘ subversive complicity with the previous 
democratic system. This is evidenced by his adoption of the role of a subversive 
politician—one who supports a democratic revolution that effectuates change for Bolivia. 
Politics provides the answer to the call for change that Morales directed toward the 
existing neoliberal and democratic models in his inaugural address. The speech 
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discursively placed subaltern subjectivities in the center; it shared his vision of politics as 
one that connects people to realize change. For Morales, this move facilitated their 
incorporation into politics and helped better equip them to achieve the change he 
advocated. His reference to politics shows another example of subversive complicity 
operating within his speech—Morales both defied traditional politics and worked hard to 
make politics into an instrument for the people:  
Politics means a science of service to the people; we must serve the people not 
live off of the people, if that is the policy. We have to live for politics and not live 
from politics.229  
I understand that politics is a way to solve the economic problems of the country. 
As we have seen, there are many people who will return after resting a year, two 
years to continue living off of politics. It must change and we must have the 
participation of you all to change those subjects.230  
As standpoint epistemology argues, the shared experiences of people can accomplish 
change; in the Bolivian context, Morales stated that the mechanism for change was in the 
―political instrument of the people, a political instrument of liberation, a political 
instrument in search for equality, justice, a political instrument such as the Movement 
Toward Socialism (MAS), which seeks to live in peace with social justice, that called for 
unity in diversity‖231 His emphasis on politics transformed the historical plight of the 
indigenous people into an emancipatory struggle that is founded upon the collective 
narrative of the indigenous. While Morales placed support for political participation 
among the Bolivian indigenous people his speech also attended to the necessity of a 
redefined politics, a politics that he provided from his subaltern standpoint. 
In the inaugural address Morales referred to himself in the third person on six 
different occasions; what is unique about these references is the way in which they 
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illustrate how subversive complicity functioned to detach Morales from the previous 
Bolivian political structure while simultaneously developing his identity as a politician 
for the Bolivian people:  
In March of last year, in the Murillo Plaza they wanted to hang Evo Morales, they 
wanted to carve up Evo Morales. That should not happen, that cannot continue 
compañeras and compañeros. Former presidents understand this is not how it is 
done.  
It is not important Evo; Evo, we are not campaigning anymore, we are only 
remembering our history, that black history, that permanent history of 
humiliation, those offenses, those lies, and everything they have said to us. 
We would like to resolve these issues, not only with the participation of 
Bolivians, but also with international cooperation. To resolve, not for Evo; I am 
not requesting participation of the international community for Evo, but for the 
Bolivian people. 232 
These passages reveal subversive complicity through a refutation of the political system 
while simultaneously avowing the possibility of politics. Rather than completely dismiss 
politics, Morales argued in favor of a distinctive political leadership centering on the 
people.  The above passages also demonstrate subversive complicity through a somewhat 
unusual discursive shift to third person references. His acceptance of the presidential 
position while referring to himself in the third person not only established a clear 
delineation between the politics of the past and the Bolivian present, but also separated 
Morales from the corruption associated with Bolivian politics. The discursive move 
challenged the idea that as a political leader he would be self absorbed and disassociated 
from the Bolivian people. It also implies Morales‘ double consciousness, his 
understanding of self as embodying an ever present two-ness by virtue of living within a 
double world meant that he was not only able to see beyond a singular consciousness but 
also understood his role as a political leader to be something greater than himself. In the 
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second example above, Morales also indicated his double-eyed approach to politics by 
recalling the colonial past of indigenous history and used us-them language to confront 
corruption from the West. Morales‘ inaugural address entailed the discursive 
resignification of symbols and the placement of subaltern subjectivities at the center of 
the knowledge production process, this move of subversive complicity with the system 
established a foundation for his presidential politics. 
ENVISIONING CRITICAL SUBALTERITY 
Evo Morales‘ inaugural address served the purpose of critiquing the dark history 
of the country and strongly resisted the historical oppression of the Bolivian indigenous 
population. The speech also criticized the colonial state of government by identifying the 
epoch of neoliberalism and capitalism‘s dangerous stranglehold over the Bolivian 
economy and its people. The argumentative conclusion presented was one of continued 
indigenous struggle; Morales‘ discourse elicited recognition of the plight of the 
indigenous peoples from their particular social location. Morales assumed the role of an 
indigenous activist, involved in the Guerra del Gas movement and supportive of the 
Bolivian indigenous population. He positioned himself within the indigenous struggle by 
claiming the plight of the indigenous people as his own. By acknowledging his 
indigenous identity Morales contributed to his credibility as an activist in the service of 
the Bolivian people. His activist role involved combating the historical narrative of 
indigenous oppression with the search for concrete solutions. When addressing the 
Bolivian people, his speech utilized various supporting materials such as statistics to 
express the importance of the Bolivian indigenous as a majority of the population. 
Additionally, Morales spoke to the authority of individuals who have experienced 
cultural democratic struggle and emphasized the need to connect with the Bolivian people 
through politics. His discourse refuted the existing political system but did not dismiss 
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politics wholesale. Instead, it supported political leadership centered on the people and 
attempted to redefine the Bolivian reality by providing an understanding of the 
indigenous population as an integral part of Bolivian society and politics. This process of 
redefinition was addressed toward the people of Bolivia and also extended to other parts 
of Latin America, as well as the broader international community. The inaugural address 
concluded with a call for international cooperation, and for consciousness from the 
international community as well as the Latin American people; it also emphasized the 
importance of political engagement of the people to overcome the narrative of indigenous 
oppression.  
I have established a theoretical framework to view the indigenous rhetoric in Evo 
Morales‘ 2006 inaugural address. I have argued that this framework is built upon the 
connection of subaltern epistemology to the convergence of the theory of ―Both Eyes,‖ 
de-colonial thinking, and subversive complicity. De-colonial thinking allows us to see 
how Morales‘ indigenous rhetoric is grounded in double consciousness which opens up 
the range of political possibilities for the Bolivian people within a democratic society. 
The speech discussed the past, present, and future of the country this structure reflected 
Morales‘ de-colonial thinking operating within the text. The perspective of subversive 
complicity was used to highlight how Morales‘ speech centered on subaltern 
subjectivities and privileged their experiences as crucial to the process of knowledge 
production. By resignifying symbols of hegemonic discourse, such as neoliberalism and 
democracy, Morales deployed an important discursive strategy that necessarily brought 
the Bolivian subaltern from the margins to the center of politics. Examining indigenous 
rhetoric in this way has illuminated Morales‘ double vision, as a visualization that brings 
the history of oppression into focus and posits a sort of subversive politics centering on 
the subaltern experience as a springboard for change. Morales‘ use of indigenous rhetoric 
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also allowed him to position himself among the Bolivian indigenous center; it is from this 
standpoint that he was able to empower the people as a group through his populist style 
leadership.  
Standpoint epistemology is useful for discussing Morales‘ inaugural address 
because it rearticulates the notion of the subaltern into the context of present-day 
Bolivian politics. It also reinforces Morales‘ subaltern position as a necessary starting 
point for political work dedicated to recovering the marginalized perspective. As an 
Aymara Indian, Morales‘ entry into presidential politics was anything but conventional—
his indigenous identity, his defiance of traditional politics, and blatant criticism of the 
West necessitated a unique rhetorical style that brought his dissident perspectives out of 
the periphery and into focus for the Bolivian people and the broader international 
community. Examining the indigenous rhetoric at work in President Evo Morales‘ 
inaugural address informs rhetorical and Latin American scholars as well as activists for 
social change. The double-lens approach offers insight to the Bolivian subaltern position 
and informs new visions for social, economic, and political change for any contemporary 
struggles against neoliberalism and Western ideology. If we are to understand the 
discourse of President Evo Morales‘ inaugural address we must be guided by standpoint 
epistemology and subaltern perspectives working in tandem with de-colonial theories to 
uncover the uniquely political dimension operating in Morales‘ rhetoric. It is a rhetoric 
that offered an unprecedented critical perspective of the political arena and enabled 
marginal voices to be recovered and the indigenous population to realize discursive 
mechanisms for political change.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Chapter 4: Learning to Unlearn, Subaltern Sensibilities for the Future 
Initially, I wanted to focus on Bolivia for this project because of my interest in 
social movements in Latin America and Spanish speaking countries. I first heard about 
the Guerra del Gas from various news sources in the United States, and then while 
studying abroad in Spain my attention was directed to the 2005 uprising. Early on I took 
an interest in the movement and its struggle for resource governance because I thought 
the conflict over neoliberalism and the criticism being raised towards Western ideology 
seemed pertinent at a time when U.S. exceptionalism was continuing on an increasing 
trajectory with what seemed to be no end in sight—offering no relief for subjugated 
peoples.  
A central component of my argument throughout this thesis has been that 
indigenous rhetoric can be understood as a discourse of subaltern sensibilities. To 
understand this rhetoric as such has required a speaking to subaltern epistemologies, and I 
have certainly attempted to do that here. In speaking to subaltern sensibilities I have 
troubled my privileged position as an academic trained in Western knowledge, and have 
begun my journey towards learning Other knowledges. As Spivak has argued, 
intellectuals systematically unlearn privilege as they seek to speak to the historically 
muted subject of the subaltern.233 Understanding the indigenous rhetoric of the Guerra 
del Gas movement has been enhanced through my attempts at systematic unlearning. I 
have approached the movement and its political implications from beyond purely 
Western concepts, in order to recognize a fundamental aspect at the heart of the Bolivian 
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resistance—the opposition to Western epistemology as the final arbiter of neoliberal 
hegemony. 
In chapter one I discussed some of the historical-cultural context surrounding 
Bolivia from periods of colonial rule to contemporary neoliberal governance and 
globalization. I argued that the Guerra del Gas and its momentous uprisings offer an 
important terrain for combining subaltern counterpublic and social movement theories as 
a lens for viewing the rhetoric of the movement. From this theoretical vantage point, I 
considered how the movement embodied indigenous rhetoric in order to directly confront 
the existing government and neoliberal agenda of natural gas privatization. To understand 
the movement as an emergent subaltern counterpublic that embodied indigenous rhetoric, 
I offered an explanation of indigenous rhetoric as a discourse of subaltern sensibilities. 
Building from this contextual and theoretical frame, the indigenous rhetoric of the 
movement was examined in combination with strategies against both neoliberalism and 
hegemonic economic and colonial practices. Such a dynamic web of the movement‘s 
rhetoric offered a multifaceted strategy of opposition that ultimately transformed Bolivian 
public policy and culminated in presidential resignations in 2003 and 2005. These 
resignations provided a sign of success for the movement, and solidified the demands for 
political change. I posited that the existence of a Bolivian subaltern counterpublic and the 
use of indigenous rhetoric facilitated the mobilization and organization of the masses 
during the Guerra del Gas.  
Chapter two recognized the plurality of demands and forces within the movement 
and argued for combined approaches to discuss the uprisings of October 2003 and May-
June 2005. I combined social movement perspectives with subaltern counterpublic theory 
and the concerns of the Bolivian people to characterize the indigenous rhetoric of the 
Guerra del Gas. The subaltern counterpublic sphere provided a nexus for resistance that 
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defied previous resource struggles and directly challenged existing political 
constructions. I examined the rhetoric of various press releases and communiqués from 
the Coordinadora social movement organization as well as the political organizations of 
the CSUTCB and MAS, to argue that the Guerra del Gas was a distinct kind of social 
movement that incorporated diverse identities in an engaged political struggle for 
alternative development. As a unifying factor for the movement, natural gas served as a 
symbol in the social struggle against government exploitation of the country‘s natural 
wealth. The organization and mass participation in the uprisings provided a sturdy 
disruption to the economy and ultimately lead to the dismissal of the previously elected 
president. The conscious decision of the Guerra del Gas movement to ―seek non-
indigenous allies and to work within existing political institutions in order to reshape 
them from inside,‖ facilitated the convergence of indigenous and popular sectors that 
paved the way for the achievement of demands at the state level by challenging the 
dominant political ideology, and ultimately electing an indigenous leader to its 
presidency.234 The election of Evo Morales represented the movement‘s articulation of a 
coherent alternative to the corruption, violence, and neoliberal hegemony imposed upon 
the Bolivian poor and indigenous population.  
The tumultuous history of the social struggle for natural gas privatization set the 
backdrop for Evo Morales‘ rise to the Bolivian presidency. I argued that Morales‘ 
inaugural address embodied indigenous rhetoric, more specifically; his speech provided 
an exemplar of the discourse of subaltern sensibilities. Morales embodied the leadership 
necessary to take charge of the country following the Guerra del Gas, he represented the 
unique political leadership grounded in subaltern epistemology. The profound situation of 
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Morales utilizing indigenous rhetoric from within the Bolivian political structure has 
demonstrated the extent to which the subaltern counterpublic sphere can challenge 
dominant discourse and enable those who have been marginalized from political power to 
have recourse—to perhaps bring about change by moving from the margins to the center. 
To the extent that the subaltern counterpublic strives to bring the margins to the center, it 
presented a subversive discourse to challenge dominant structures and enable the 
subaltern to have political power. 
In an increasingly globalized world it is important for communication scholars to 
expand their purviews of rhetorical criticism to international contexts. Examining the 
Bolivian struggle against neoliberal hegemony contributes to an understanding of the 
dynamics of the subaltern counterpublic sphere, and of the need to focus attention on 
indigenous rhetoric as a unique contribution to social movement mobilization and success 
in the political arena. This thesis informs scholars of social movements and rhetoric, it 
contributing an understanding of postcolonial theories and their application within 
communication studies research.  
   
 







―Manifiesto al pueblo boliviano‖  
Coordinadora Nacional de Recuperación y Defensa del Gas 
Cochabamba, octubre 4 de 2003 
 
Unidad ante estado de sitio y autogolpe de estado  
1.    El pueblo boliviano, desde abril del 2000, ha establecido con claridad y dignidad 
que es posible cambiar las condiciones de vida, que es posible prescindir y 
derrotar a aquellos que hasta el día de hoy deciden por nosotros, a espaldas de 
nosotros y contra nosotros, esos llamados gobernantes que están ciegos, sordos y 
torpes ante las demandas de la población. La gente sencilla y trabajadora ha 
empezado a escribir, diseñar y construir una nueva democracia, la participativa, la 
de las organizaciones de multitudes con dirección colectiva y horizontal, donde 
las decisiones sean tomadas por todos, sin que los caudillos o partidos políticos 
nos den permiso para hacerlo.  
2. Hoy, a raíz del tema del GAS, el pueblo se ha rebelado, está indignado por el 
manejo absolutamente antipatriótico y antidemocrático de primero haberse 
enterado que a naves de la ley de hidrocarburos y el decreto 27.408, Sánchez de 
Lozada ha entregado nuestros hidrocarburos y recursos naturales y propiedad a las 
empresas transnacionales, y segundo, en contubernios con la oligarquía chilena, 
pretende regalar nuestro GAS, para el potenciamiento económico y militar de ese 
país.  
3. A partir del 5 de septiembre de este año, continuando con la construcción de esos 
espacios de deliberación y dignidad se estableció la COORDINADORA 
NACIONAL DE RECUPERACIÓN Y DEFENSA DEL GAS, como instrumento 
que posibilite esa tarea que desde hace años arras se está impulsando, donde el 
protagonista de la organización, movilización y propuestas sea el pueblo 
boliviano.  
4. La primera muestra de unidad y capacidad movilizadora se demostró el día 19 de 
septiembre, cuando más de medio millón de personas, no sólo en las principales 
ciudades, sino en pueblos y pequeñas comunidades a lo largo y ancho del país 




5. Desde aquel día los conflictos sectoriales y la lucha por la recuperación se han 
intensificado y radicalizado, ahí están los primeros cinco mártires del GAS en 
Warisata y las múltiples demandas de sectores que rechazan la política de 
imposición y empobrecimiento del actual gobierno.   
 
6. A todas estas protestas y señales dadas por el pueblo, el gobierno ha contestado 
con represión y menosprecio, a esto se ha sumado el pedido general izado de que 
los gobernantes se vayan, lo que en la práctica significa la pérdida de legitimidad 
del actual gobierno, sumado a esto las últimas actuaciones de los políticos en la 
nominación de cargos en el aparato estatal demuestra la falta total de ubicación de 
la realidad del país y la indignación de la gente en contra de la autodenominada 
"clase política".  
 
7. Por eso, desde la Coordinadora Nacional por la Recuperación y Defensa del Gas 
hacemos un llamado a todos los sectores, partidos políticos y líderes de los 
movimientos sociales a establecer el re-encauzamiento de la UNIDAD en torno al 
tema del GAS, como única forma de enfrentar inclusive la posibilidad cierta de un 
estado de sitio o un autogolpe, como se ha ido denunciando, UNIDAD sin 
protagonismos, estableciendo una dirección horizontal, colectiva, solidaria. Las 
acciones aisladas, la pretendida unidad con verticalismos y autoritarismos sólo 
conducirán al pueblo al precipicio y la confrontación en desigualdad de 
condiciones, donde el pueblo será nuevamente el que ponga a sus muertos. 
 
8. Convocamos de manera vehemente a todos ellos, a todos nosotros, a través de la 
lucha por el GAS, a empezar a diseñar y construir un nuevo país. La 
ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE es el camino para aquello. Una Asamblea 
desde abajo, entre todos los excluidos, ignorados y despreciados, sin la 
intermediación partidaria, aquella que tanto daño ha hecho al país. 
 
9.  Fuera a aquellos que han demostrado que no sirven para nada y que dejen el paso 
a la gente autoorganizada, y que ahora con sus actitudes y medidas están poniendo 
en riesgo la propia existencia como nación. 
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Appendix B 
―Manifesto to the Bolivian People‖  
National Coordinator for the Defense and Recovery of Gas 
Cochabamba, Octubre 4, 2003 
 
Unity before a state of siege and self coup d’etat 
1. The Bolivian people, since April of the 2000, have established with clarity and 
dignity that it is possible to change the conditions of life, that it is possible to 
dispense with and defeat those that until today had decided for us, behind our 
backs and against us, those so-called rulers who are blind, deaf and clumsy before 
the demands of the population. Simple people and workers have begun to write, to 
plan and to construct to a new participatory democracy, one made of 
organizations of the multitudes with collective and horizontal direction, where the 
decisions are made by all, without the leaders or political parties giving us 
permission to do it.  
2. Today, regarding the issue of GAS, the people have rebelled, they are indignant of 
the absolutely unpatriotic and undemocratic management firstly for having 
become aware of the shipment through the hydrocarbons law and decree number 
27,408, in which Sánchez de Lozada has given our hydrocarbons and natural 
resources and property to transnational companies, and secondly, in conspiracy 
with the Chilean oligarchy, he tries to give away our GAS, for the economic and 
military promotion of that country.  
3. Since the 5th of September of this year, continuing with the construction of those 
spaces of deliberation and dignity the NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR THE 
DEFENSE AND RECOVERY OF GAS has established itself as a tool that makes 
that task possible, which has been pledged for years, where the leader of 
organization, mobilization and proposals is the Bolivian people. 
4. The first showing of unity and mobilizing capacity was demonstrated the day  of 
September 19th, when more than half a million people, not only in the main cities, 
but in towns and small communities spanning the length and width of the country 





5. Since that day the sectoral conflicts and the struggle for the recovery have 
intensified and radicalized, there were the first five martyrs of the GAS war in 
Warisata and the multiple demands of the sectors that reject the present 
government‘s policy of imposition and impoverishment. 
6. In response to all these protests and signals from the people, the government has 
answered with repression and contempt, this has been added the generally raised 
order for the rulers to leave, which in practice means the loss of legitimacy of the 
current government, in addition there are the latest activities of politicians in 
appointed positions in the state apparatus that demonstrate a  total lack of reality 
with the situation of the country and the indignation of the people against the self-
appointed ―political class.‖ 
7. For that reason, from the National Coordinator for the Defense and Recovery of 
Gas we make a political call to all sectors, political parties and leaders of the 
social movements to establish the re-channeling of UNITY around the topic of 
GAS, as the only way to face the certain possibility of including a state of siege or 
self-coup, as has been denounced, UNITY without leaders, establishing a 
horizontal direction, collective, solidarity. The isolated actions, the attempted 
unity with verticalisms and authoritarianisms will only lead the people to the 
precipice and confrontation in unequal conditions, where the people will again put 
their dead. 
8. We vehemently call on all of them, all of us, through the struggle for GAS, to 
begin to design and construct a new country. The CONSTITUTIONAL 
ASSEMBLY is the way for that. An Assembly from below, among all the 
excluded, ignored and despised, without the intermediary party, that has done so 
much damage to the country. 
 
9. Outside those that have demonstrated that they do not serve for anything and that 
they are left leave the step to the self-organized people, and now with their 




1. Estamos en la obligación de hacer una gran reminiscencia sobre el movimiento 
indígena sobre la situación de la época colonial, de la época republican y de la 
época del neoliberalismo. Los pueblos indígenas -que son mayoría de la población 
boliviana-, para la prensa internacional, para que los invitados sepan: de acuerdo 
al último censo del 2001, el 62.2% de aymaras, de quechuas, de mojeños, de 
chipayas, de muratos, de guaraníes. Estos pueblos, históricamente hemos sido 
marginados, humillados, odiados, despreciados, condenados a la extinción. Esa es 
nuestra historia; a estos pueblos jamás los reconocieron como seres humanos, 
siendo que estos pueblos son dueños absolutos de esta noble tierra, de sus 
recursos naturales.  
2. Esta mañana, esta madrugada, con mucha alegría he visto a algunos hermanos y 
hermanas cantando en la plaza histórica de Murillo, la Plaza Murillo como 
también la Plaza San Francisco, cuando hace 40, 50 años no teníamos derecho a 
entrar a la Plaza San Francisco, a la Plaza Murillo. Hace 40, 50 años no tenían 
nuestros antepasados el derecho de caminar en las aceras. Esa es nuestra historia, 
esa nuestra vivencia.  
 
3. Bolivia parece Sudáfrica. Amenazados, condenados al exterminio estamos acá, 
estamos presentes. Quiero decirles que todavía hay resabios de esa gente que es 
enemiga de los pueblos indígenas, queremos vivir en igualdad de condiciones con 
ellos, y por eso estamos acá para cambiar nuestra historia, este movimiento 
indígena originario no es concesión de nadie; nadie nos ha regalado, es la 
conciencia de mi pueblo, de nuestro pueblo.  
 
4. Quiero decirles, para que sepa la prensa internacional, a los primeros aymaras, 
quechuas que aprendieron a leer y escribir, les sacaron los ojos, cortaron las 
manos para que nunca más aprendan a leer, escribir. Hemos sido sometidos, ahora 
estamos buscando cómo resolver ese problema histórico, no con venganzas, no 
somos rencorosos.  
 
5. Y quiero decirles sobre todo a los hermanos indígenas de América concentrados 
acá en Bolivia: la campaña de 500 años de resistencia indígena- negro- popular no 
ha sido en vano; la campaña de 500 años de resistencia indígena popular 






6. Estamos acá para decir, basta a la resistencia. De la resistencia de 500 años a la 
toma del poder para 500 años, indígenas, obreros, todos los sectores para acabar 
con esa injusticia, para acabar con esa desigualdad, para acabar sobre todo con la 
discriminación, opresión donde hemos sido sometidos como aymaras, quechuas, 
guaraníes.  
 
7. Respetamos, admiramos muchísimo a todos los sectores, sean profesionales o no 
profesionales, intelectuales y no intelectuales, empresarios y no empresarios. 
Todos tenemos derecho a vivir en esta vida, en esta tierra, y este resultado de las 
elecciones nacionales es, justamente, la combinación de la conciencia social con 
la capacidad profesional. Ahí pueden ver que el movimiento indígena originario 
no es excluyente. Ojala, ojala, otros señores también aprendan de nosotros.  
 
8. Yo quiero decirles con mucha sinceridad y con mucha humildad, después de que 
he visto muchos compañeros de la ciudad, hermanos de la ciudad, profesionales, 
la clase media, intelectuales, hasta empresarios, que se suman al MAS. Muchas 
gracias, yo me siento orgulloso de ellos, de nuestra clase media, intelectual, 
profesional, hasta empresarial, pero también les invito a ustedes que se sientan 
orgullosos de los pueblos indígenas que es la reserva moral de la humanidad.  
 
9. Podemos seguir hablando de nuestra historia, podemos seguir recordando como 
nuestros antepasados lucharon: Túpac Katari para restaurar el Tahuantinsuyo, 
Simón Bolívar que luchó por esa patria grande, Ché Guevara que luchó por un 
nuevo mundo en igualdad.  
 
10. Esa lucha democrática cultural, esta revolución cultural democrática, es parte de 
la lucha de nuestros antepasados, es la continuidad de la lucha de Túpac Katari; 
esa lucha y estos resultados son la continuidad de Che Guevara. Estamos ahí 
hermanas y hermanos de Bolivia y de Latinoamérica; vamos a continuar hasta 
conseguir esa igualdad en nuestro país, no es importante concentrar el capital en 
pocas manos para que muchos se mueran de hambre, esas políticas tienen que 
cambiar pero tienen que cambiar en democracia.  
 
11. No es posible que algunos sigan buscando como saquear, explotar, marginar. No 
solo nosotros queremos vivir bien, seguramente algunos tienen derecho a vivir 
mejor, tienen todo el derecho de vivir mejor, pero sin explotar, sin robar, sin 
humillar, sin someter a la esclavitud. Eso debe cambiar hermanas y hermanos.  
 
12. Quiero decirles, a ese movimiento popular, a esa gente andina honesta de las 
ciudades, especialmente al movimiento indígena originario, para que vean, no 
estamos solos, ni en los movimientos sociales ni en los gobiernos de América, de 
Europa de Asia, de África, aunque lamentablemente, hasta los últimos días, la 
guerra sucia, la guerra mentirosa eso no va; eso hay que cambiar, es verdad que 
duele. En base a la mentira, en base a la calumnia nos quieren humillar.  
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13. ¿Recuerdan? en marzo del año pasado, en esta Plaza Murillo querían hacer colgar 
a Evo Morales, querían descuartizar a Evo Morales. Eso no debe ocurrir, eso no 
puede seguir compañeras y compañeros. Ex presidentes entiendan eso no se hace, 
no se margina, se lucha; se trabaja para todos y para todas.  
 
14. No es importante Evo; Evo, no estamos en campaña ya, solo estamos recordando 
nuestra historia, esa historia negra, esa historia permanente de humillación, esa 
ofensiva, esas mentiras, de todo nos han dicho. Verdad que duele pero tampoco 
estamos para seguir llorando por los 500 años; ya no estamos en esa época, 
estamos en época de triunfo, de alegría, de fiesta. Es por eso, creo que es 
importante cambiar nuestra historia, cambiar nuestra Bolivia, nuestra 
Latinoamérica.  
 
15. Estamos acá en democracia, y quiero que sepan -sobre todo la comunidad 
internacional-, como nuestro vicepresidente de la República decía en una 
conferencia: queremos cambiar Bolivia no con bala sino con voto, y esa es la 
revolución democrática.  
 
16. ¿Y por qué hablamos de cambiar ese estado colonial?, tenemos que acabar con el 
estado colonial. Imagínense: después de 180 años de la vida democrática 
republicana recién podemos llegar acá, podemos estar en el Parlamento, podemos 
estar en la presidencia, en las alcaldías. Antes no teníamos derecho.  
 
17. Imagínense. El voto universal el año 1952 ha costado sangre. Campesinos 
mineros levantados en armas para conseguir el voto universal -que no es ninguna 
concesión de ningún partido-, se organizaron; esa conquista, esa lucha de los 
pueblos.  
 
18. Imagínense, recién el 2003 se ha podido conseguir con sangre el Referéndum 
vinculante para que los pueblos, los bolivianos no solamente tengamos derecho 
que cada cinco años elijamos con nuestro voto quién será alcalde, quién será el 
concejal, quién es el presidente, vicepresidente, senador o diputado; que también 
con nuestro voto decidamos el destino del país, nuestro futuro. Y ese Referéndum 
vinculante también ha costado sangre.  
 
19. Ahí estaba el estado colonial, y aún todavía sigue vigente ese estado colonial. 
Imagínense, no es posible, no es posible que no haya en el Ejército nacional un 
general Condori, un general Villca, un general Mamani, un general Ayma. No hay 
todavía, ahí está el estado colonial. 
 
20. Para cambiar ese estado colonial habrá espacios, debates, diálogos. Estamos en la 
obligación, como bolivianos, de entendernos para cambiar esta forma de 
discriminar a los pueblos.  
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21. Permanentemente antes se hablaba de la democracia, se lucha por la democracia, 
se hablaba de pacto por la democracia, pacto por la gobernabilidad. El año 1997 
cuando llegué a este Parlamento que he visto personalmente, ningún pacto por la 
democracia ni por la gobernabilidad, sino los pactos de la corrupción, pacto de 
cómo sacar plata de dónde y cómo, felizmente había tenido límite y se acabó 
gracias a la conciencia del pueblo boliviano.  
 
22. Maniobras más maniobras. La forma de cómo engañar al pueblo, la forma de 
cómo subastar al pueblo. Nos dejaron un país loteado, un Estado loteado, un país 
subastado. Yo estoy casi convencido: si hubieran sido inteligentes 
administradores del Estado, si hubieran querido esta patria, amado esta patria y no 
como algunos solo quieren a esta patria para saquear y enriquecerse, si realmente 
hubiera habido gente responsable para manejar amando a esta patria, a su pueblo, 
Bolivia sería mejor que Suiza.  
 
23. Suiza, un país desarrollado sin recursos naturales, y Bolivia con semejantes 
recursos naturales y con semejante pobreza. Eso hay que cambiar, y por eso 
estamos acá para cambiar juntos estas injusticias, este saqueo permanente a 
nuestros recursos naturales.  
 
24. Después de escuchar el informe de las comisiones de transición, he podido ver 
como el Estado no controla al Estado, sus instituciones. Una dependencia total, 
como hemos visto en lo económico, un país transnacionalizado. Su pretexto de 
capitalización solo ha descapitalizado al país. Su pretexto de capitalización, 
entiendo que hay que importar el capital en vez de exportar el capital. Solo se 
exporta al capital y sólo se exporta ahora como producto de esas políticas de 
capitalización, al ser humano. No se gobierna así estimados parlamentarios, no se 
gobierna así, quienes pasaron por el Palacio de Gobierno y por el Parlamento.  
 
25. La política significa una ciencia de servicio al pueblo, hay que servir al pueblo no 
vivir del pueblo, si esa es la política. Hay que vivir para la política y no vivir de la 
política.  
 
26. Hermanas y hermanos, nuestras autoridades originarias saben exactamente que 
cuando uno asume ser autoridad, es para servir al pueblo, y estos temas hay que 
cambiar pues, y están aquí parlamentarios para servir, si realmente están 
decididos, a servir los 5 años. Eso quisiéramos, en todo caso hay que tomar ciertas 
medidas para que el pueblo entienda.  
 
27. Entiendo que la política es una forma de resolver los problemas económicos del 
país. Hemos visto, hay mucha gente que seguramente vuelve después de 
descansar un año, dos años para seguir viviendo de la política. Hay que cambiar y 
estamos con la participación de ustedes cambiar esos temas.  
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28. No es posible se privatice los servicios básicos. No puedo entender cómo los ex 
gobernantes privaticen los servicios básicos especialmente el agua. El agua es un 
recurso natural, sin agua no podemos vivir, por tanto el agua no puede ser de 
negocio privado, desde el momento que es negocio privado se violan los derechos 
humanos. El agua debe ser de servicio público.  
 
29. Las luchas por agua, por coca, por gas natural nos han traído acá hermanas y 
hermanos. Hay que reconocer que esas políticas equivocadas, erradas, interesadas, 
recursos naturales subastadas, servicios básicos privatizadas. obligó a que haya 
conciencia del pueblo boliviano. Estamos en la obligación de cambiar estas 
políticas.  
 
30. Constitucionalmente es inconstitucional el latifundio. Lamentablemente por 
intereses de grupos de poder hay latifundio. ¿Como es posible que haya 
latifundio?, ¿cómo es posible cuando algunos sectores plantean, necesitan 20, 30, 
40, 50 hectáreas para criar una vaca, habría que ser una vaca para tener 50 
hectáreas?. Eso es parte de un modelo económico.  
 
31. Hay familias, veamos en Titicaca, en Parotani, le pedimos a nuestro senador por 
Cochabamba (Hoz de Vila) no se duerma, estamos hablando de Parotani, donde ni 
siquiera familias tienen 5 hectáreas, ni media hectárea, ni cuarta hectárea, ni 
siquiera tienen cuarta hectárea, pero si el oriente boliviano por vaca hay que dar 
50 hectáreas. Eso debemos cambiar, estamos aquí, repito, para cambiar esta 
injusticia, esta desigualdad.  
 
32. Estas políticas económicas implementadas por instrucciones externas, por 
recomendaciones externas, ¿que nos han dejado?: desempleo. Nos dijeron hace 
unos 10, 15 años, o 20 años que aquí la empresa privada va a resolver los 
problemas de la corrupción y los problemas del desempleo. Pasan tantos años, 
más desempleo, más corrupción, que por tanto ese modelo económico no es 
solución para nuestro país, tal vez en algún país europeo o africano puede ser una 
solución. En Bolivia el modelo neoliberal no va.  
 
33. Producto de la aplicación de este modelo neoliberal hemos visto de cerca qué 
pasa. El Estado gasta para que un joven, sea del campo o la ciudad sea 
profesional, la familia gasta para que su hijo sea profesional, es profesional, no 
hay empleo, ese profesional tiene que pensar en Argentina, Estados Unidos o en 
Europa. Hoy en día se va a Europa ese joven que no encuentra trabajo, sea 
profesional o no profesional. ¿Cuántos familiares de ustedes están, sino es en 
Argentina, sino es en Estados Unidos, está en Europa?, ¿cuantos de nuestros 
vecinos hermanas y hermanos, es el producto de la aplicación del modelo 
neoliberal?. Esa es la ley de capitalización, esas son políticas de subasta, de 





34. ¿Y a qué van, a Estados Unidos, a Europa o Argentina o a otros países?, 
lamentablemente - hay que decir la verdad-, van de meseros. Esos profesionales, 
van a lavar platos. Duele de verdad, repito otra vez, teniendo tantos recursos 
naturales que la gente abandone nuestro país. Creo aún todavía, tenemos la 
responsabilidad de cómo saldar ese error social, económico e histórico, que mejor 
juntos todos podemos cambiar y corregir esos errores implementados por 
instituciones seguramente extranjeras. 
 
35. Imagínense, escuelas rurales llamadas seccionales, sin luz. Estamos en el tercer 
milenio, que me acuerdo donde nací, donde por primera vez he ido a una escuela 
seccional, hace dos años ha llegado la luz, pero en otras escuelas seccionales 
como Acunami, Chivo, Rosapata, Arcorcaya, todavía no hay luz. ¿Como será en 
otras comunidades?, no hay camino carretero, el profesor tiene que caminar horas 
y días para llegar a la escuela seccional. ¿Qué han hecho esos gobernantes?, 
¿Acaso no sienten lo que sufren las mayorías nacionales, los niños?. En vez de 
juntar plata en los bancos, en vez de ahorrar plata en Estados Unidos, en Europa o 
en Suiza, ¿por qué esa plata no ha invertido en su país, si son solidarios?.  
 
36. Imagínense ustedes, en el campo sobre todo, la mayor parte de los niños muere y 
muy pocos se salvan de esa muerte. Estos temas quisiéramos solucionarlos, no 
solamente con la participación de los bolivianos, sino también de la cooperación 
internacional. Resolver, no para Evo; no estoy pidiendo participación de la 
comunidad internacional para Evo sino para el pueblo boliviano.  
 
37. Y quisiéramos de verdad, de verdad, que haya una conciencia no solo nacional 
sino internacional. Seguramente algunos países también tienen que ponerse la 
mano al pecho para pensar en las mayorías no solo bolivianas sino 
latinoamericanas.  
 
38. Es verdad que va a ser importante. ¿Cómo buscar mecanismos que permita 
reparar los daños de 500 años de saqueo a nuestros recursos naturales? será otra 
tarea que vamos a implementar en nuestro gobierno.  
 
39. Por esa clase de injusticias nace este llamado instrumento político por la 
soberanía, un instrumento político del pueblo, un instrumento político de la 
liberación, un instrumento político para buscar la igualdad, la justicia, un 
instrumento político como el Movimiento Al Socialismo, que busca vivir, paz con 





1. We are obligated to perform a great reminiscence about the indigenous 
movement, about the situation of the colonial period, about the republican period 
and the period of neoliberalism. Indigenous peoples – who are the majority of the 
Bolivian population, so that the international press and guests know, according to 
the latest census of 2001, 62.2% are Aymaras, Quechuas, Mojeños, Chipayas, 
Muratos, and Guaraníes. These people, we have historically been marginalized, 
humiliated, hated, unappreciated, and condemned to extinction. That is our 
history; they never recognized these people as human beings, that these people are 
absolute owners of this noble earth, of its natural resources.  
2. This morning, at dawn, with much joy I have seen some sisters and brothers 
singing in the historical Murillo Plaza, the Murillo Plaza like the San Francisco 
Plaza, when 40 to 50 years ago we did not have the right to enter the San 
Francisco Plaza or the Murillo Plaza. For 40, 50 years our ancestors did not have 
the right to walk on the sidewalks. That is our history that is our experience.  
 
3. Bolivia appears to be South Africa. Threatened, condemned to extermination, we 
are here, we are present. I want to tell you all that there are still remnants of those 
people who are the enemies of indigenous peoples, we want to live on equal terms 
with them, and for that reason we are here to change our history. This original 
indigenous movement is not granted by anyone; no one has given it to us, it is the 
consciousness of my people, of our people.  
 
4. I want to tell you, so that the international press knows the first Aymaras, 
Quechuas that learned to read and to write, had their eyes removed, their hands 
cut off so that they may never again learn to read or to write. We have been 
subjected, now we are looking for a way to solve that historical problem, but not 
with revenge, because we are not spiteful.  
 
5. And I want to say especially to the indigenous brothers of America concentrated 
here in Bolivia: the campaign of 500 years of popular black-indigenous resistance 
has not been in vain; the campaign of 500 years of popular indigenous resistance 
started in 1988 and 1989, has not been in vain.  
 
6. We are here to say, enough with the resistance. For 500 years of resistance and 
the takeover of power for 500 years, indigenous people, workers, and all sectors 
have worked to end that injustice, to end that inequality, and above all to end the 
discrimination, the oppression, that we have been subjected as Aymaras, 




7. We respect, we admire all the sectors very much, whether they are professional or 
nonprofessional, intellectual or nonintellectual, entrepreneurs or non-
entrepreneurs. We all have the right to live in this life, on this earth. And the 
outcome of the national elections is, precisely, the combination of social 
consciousness with professional capacity. From there all can see that the original 
indigenous movement is not exclusive. Hopefully, hopefully, others may also 
learn from us. 
 
8. Let me tell you with much sincerity and much humility, after I have seen many 
companions of the city, brothers of the city, professionals, the middle-class, 
intellectuals, and even entrepreneurs, add themselves to the Movement Toward 
Socialism (MAS). Thank you very much, I feel proud of them all, of our middle-
class, intellectuals, professionals, and even enterprises, but also I invite you all to 
feel proud of the indigenous peoples that are the moral reserve of humanity.  
 
9. We can continue speaking of our history; we can continue remembering how our 
ancestors fought: Túpac Katari fought to recover the Tahuantinsuyo, Simon 
Bolivar who fought for this great homeland, Che Guevara who fought for equality 
in a new world.  
 
10. That cultural democratic struggle, this cultural democratic revolution, is part of 
the struggle of our ancestors; it is the continuation of Túpac Katari‘s struggle; that 
struggle and these results are the continuation of Che Guevara. Hence we are 
sisters and brothers of Bolivia and of Latin America; we shall continue until 
securing such equality in our country. It is not important to concentrate capital in 
a few hands so that many die of hunger, these policies have to change but they 
must change in democracy. 
 
11. It is not possible that some can continue to look for ways to plunder, exploit, and 
marginalize. It is not only us who want to live well, surely some have the right to 
live better; you all have every right to live better, but without exploiting, stealing, 
humiliating, or submitting to slavery. That is what must change, sisters and 
brothers.  
 
12. Let me tell you, to that popular movement, to those honest Andean people of the 
cities, and especially to the original indigenous movement, so that you may all 
see, we are not alone, neither in the social movements nor in the governments of 
America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Although unfortunately, up until these last 
few days, the dirty war, the lying war that does not work; that must change, it is 
the truth that hurts. On the basis of lies, on the basis of slander they want to 




13. Remember? In March of last year, in the Murillo Plaza they wanted to hang Evo 
Morales, they wanted to carve up Evo Morales. That should not happen, that 
cannot continue compañeras and compañeros. Former presidents understand this 
is not how it is done. Do not marginalize, but struggle; one works for all men and 
all women.  
 
14. It is not important Evo; Evo, we are not campaigning anymore, we are only 
remembering our history, that black history, that permanent history of 
humiliation, those offenses, those lies, and everything they have said to us. Truth 
hurts but we are not here to continue crying for 500 years; since we are no longer 
in that time, we are in times of triumph, joy, celebration. That is why I believe it 
is important to change our history, change our Bolivia, our Latin America.  
 
15. We are here in democracy, and I want you to know, especially the international 
community, that as our vice-president of the Republic said in a conference: we 
want to change Bolivia not with bullets but with votes, and that is the democratic 
revolution. 
 
16. And why do we talk of changing that colonial state? We must end with the 
colonial state. Imagine: after 180 years of the Republican Democratic life we can 
just now arrive here, we can be in Parliament; we can be in the presidency, and in 
the mayorships. Before we did not have the right.  
 
17. Imagine: the universal vote in 1952 cost blood. Peasant miners raised arms to 
secure the universal vote - that it was not a concession of any party, they 
organized themselves; for that conquest, for that pueblo struggle.  
 
18. Imagine, just in 2003 we have been able to secure with blood the binding 
Referendum for the pueblos, Bolivians not only have the right to choose every 
five years with our vote who will be mayor, who will be councilman, who is the 
president, vice-president, senator or deputy; also with our vote we decide the 
destiny of the country, our future. And that binding Referendum also has cost 
blood.  
 
19. There was the colonial state, and that colonial state still continues to be effective. 
Imagine, it is not possible; it is not possible that in the National army there is no 
general Condori, general Villca, general Mamani, general Ayma. Still there is not, 
that is where the colonial state is.  
 
20. In order to change that colonial state there will need to be spaces, debates, 
dialogues. We are under obligation, as Bolivians, to understand ourselves, to 
change this way of discriminating against the people.  
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21. Before there was talk of democracy, democracy was constantly fought for; there 
was talk of a pact for democracy, a pact of governability. The year 1997 when I 
arrived at this Parliament that I have seen personally, no pact for democracy or 
governability, but pacts of corruption, pacts of how to make money from where 
and how, fortunately it has been limited and ended thanks to the consciousness of 
the Bolivian people.  
 
22. Maneuvers more maneuvers, the way in which to deceive the people, the way to 
auction off the people. They left us a divided country, a divided State, an 
auctioned off country. I am almost convinced: if they had been intelligent 
administrators of the State, if they had wanted this homeland, loved this homeland 
and not as some people who only want a homeland to plunder and make 
themselves rich, if there had really been responsible people to handle loving this 
homeland, its people, Bolivia would be better than Switzerland.  
 
23. Switzerland, a country developed without natural resources, and Bolivia with 
similar natural resources and similar poverty. That needs to change, and for that 
reason we are here together to change these injustices, this constant plundering of 
our natural resources.  
 
24. After listening to the report of the transition commissions, I have been able to see 
how the State does not control itself, its institutions. A total dependency, as we 
have seen with the economy, a transnationalized country. Their pretext of 
capitalization has only decapitalized the country. Their pretext of capitalization, I 
understand that we must import capital instead of exporting capital. It is only 
exported to the capital and it is only exported now as a product of those policies 
of capitalization, to human beings. Governing is not like that esteemed 
parliamentarians; to govern is not like that, those who went through the Palace of 
Government and the Parliament.  
 
25. Politics means a science of service to the people; we must serve the people not 
live off of the people, if that is the policy. We have to live for politics and not live 
from politics.  
 
26. Sisters and brothers, our original authorities know exactly that when one assumes 
to be an authority, it is to serve the people, and these issues must be changed, and 
parliamentarians you are here to serve, if you are really determined, to serve five 
years. That is what we would want; in every case we must take certain measures 
so that the people understand.  
 
27. I understand that politics is a way to solve the economic problems of the country. 
As we have seen, there are many people who will return after resting a year, two 
years to continue living off of politics. It must change and we must have the 
participation of you all to change those subjects.  
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28. It is not possible to privatize the basic services. I cannot understand how the 
former rulers privatize the basic services especially water. Water is a natural 
resource, without water we cannot live, therefore the water cannot be of private 
business, from the moment that it is private business human rights are violated. 
Water must be a public service.  
 
29. The fights for water, coca, and natural gas have brought us here sisters and 
brothers. We must recognize that those mistaken, wrong, selfish policies, have 
auctioned off natural resources, and privatized basic services. This forced there to 
be a consciousness of the Bolivian people. We are obligated to change these 
policies.  
 
30. Constitutionally speaking, the large estate is unconstitutional. Lamentably due to 
interests of powerful groups the large estate exists. How it is possible that there 
are large estates? How is it possible when some sectors suggest they need 20, 30, 
40, 50 hectares to raise a cow, which cow would need to have 50 hectares? That is 
part of an unconstitutional economic model.  
 
31. We see there are families, in Titicaca, in Parotani, we asked our senator from 
Cochabamba (Hoz de Vila) to stay vigilant, we are talking about Parotani, where 
families do not even have five hectares, or half a hectare, or a quarter hectare, and 
some do not even have a quarter hectare, but are told the Bolivian east cow must 
be given 50 hectares. That we must change, we are here, I repeat, to change this 
injustice, this inequality.  
 
32. These economic policies implemented according to external instructions, through 
external recommendations, what have they left us? : unemployment. We were told 
about 10, 15, or 20 years ago that here private enterprise will solve the problems 
of corruption and the problems of unemployment. Many years passed, more 
unemployment, more corruption, than therefore this economic model is not a 
solution for our country, perhaps in some European country or African it can be a 
solution. In Bolivia the neoliberal model does not function.  
 
33. We have seen closely the products from the application of the neoliberal model. 
The State spends money so that a young person, whether from a rural area, or the 
city can be a professional; a family spends money so that their child can be a 
professional, they are a professional, and there are no jobs, so that professional 
must think about Argentina, the United States or Europe. Nowadays that young 
person who goes away to Europe cannot find a job, professional or 
nonprofessional. How many relatives of yours are there, if not in Argentina, in the 
United States, in Europe? How many of our neighbors, sisters and brothers are the 
product of the application of the neoliberal model? That is the law of 
capitalization; those are the politics of auction, of plundering our natural 
resources.  
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34. And what are they after in the United States, Argentina, and Europe? 
Unfortunately – we must tell the truth, they go to be waiters. Those professionals 
are going to wash plates. It hurts really, I repeat again, having so many natural 
resources that people leave our country. I believe even still, we have the 
responsibility to settle these social, economic and historical errors, that together 
we can all better change and correct those errors surely implemented by foreign 
institutions.  
 
35. Imagine, rural schools called sectionals, without light. We are in the third 
millenium, that I remember where I was born, where for the first time I went to a 
sectional school, two years ago it reached the light, but in other sectional schools 
such as Acunami, Chivo, Rosapata, Arcorcaya, there is still no light. How will it 
be in other communities? There is no highway; the teacher must walk hours and 
days to arrive at the sectional school. What have these rulers done? Perhaps they 
do not feel the suffering of the national majorities, the children. Instead of 
collecting money in banks, instead of saving money in the United States, Europe 
or Switzerland, why hasn‘t the money been invested in your country, if you are all 
united in support?  
 
36. Imagine, especially in the countryside, the majority of children die and very few 
are saved from that death. We would like to resolve these issues, not only with the 
participation of Bolivians, but also with international cooperation. To resolve, not 
for Evo; I am not requesting participation of the international community for Evo, 
but for the Bolivian people.  
 
37. And we would truly want, truly, for there to be not only national but international 
consciousness. Surely some countries also have to put their hands to their chest to 
think of not only the Bolivian but also the Latin American majorities. 
 
38. It is truth that is will be important. How can we find mechanisms that allow us to 
repair the damages from 500 years of plundering our natural resources? It will be 
another task that we are going to implement in our government.  
 
39. Because of those kinds of injustices, this call for a political instrument for 
sovereignty was born, a political instrument of the people, a political instrument 
of liberation, a political instrument in search for equality, justice, a political 
instrument such as the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), which seeks to live 
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